Injunctions are a discretionary remedy used by the courts to protect personal or property rights. They are available where a monetary award would not adequately compensate a claimant for the damage suffered.
In Watson v Croft Promo-Sport Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 15; [2009] PLSCS 23, local residents sought an injunction against the owner of a motor-racing track, complaining of excessive noise. They were not against all the activities per se but objected to the noise from vehicle testing and track days, when members of the public drove vehicles at speed that day. The owner of the circuit used the track in accordance with thresholds set out in a section 106 undertaking that had been accepted by the planning authority. None the less, the High Court was satisfied that the noisier fixtures that constituted a nuisance. However, the judge awarded damages, instead of an injunction, because the residents had not issued proceedings quickly enough and had indicated that they would accept compensation for some of the noisier events held at the track.
The Court of Appeal has overruled the judge and has granted the residents an injunction. Practitioners will be interested in the reasons for its decision since they are often asked to advise on the remedies that might be awarded for a breach of covenant or some other wrongful act.
Their lordships applied the decision in Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co Ltd [1895] 1 Ch 287. This established that a claimant is generally entitled to an injunction against a party that commits a wrongful act because the wrongdoer is not entitled to ask the court to sanction its wrongdoing by ordering it to pay damages to extinguish the claimant’s legal rights. However, the courts may award damages, instead of an injunction, where: (i) the injury to the claimant’s rights is small; (ii) its value is capable of being estimated in money; (iii) the claimant can be adequately compensated in monetary terms; (iv) it would be oppressive or unjust to grant an injunction.
The Court of Appeal concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances justifing an award of damages rather than an injunction. In addition, it would not be oppressive or unjust to grant an injunction. Nothing had occurred in the period of delay (from March 2003 to February 2005) to render the grant of an injunction unconscionable and, given the scale of the judge’s award, which totalled £149,600, the injury to the residents’ rights could hardly be described as small.
Interestingly, the court also ruled that the fact that a claimant may be prepared to accept monetary compensation up to a certain level of inconvenience did not mean that it was either willing or capable of being compensated in money for inconvenience suffered in excess of that level. The residents were not seeking to prevent the wrongdoer’s core activities and the fact that members of the public benefited from the wrongdoer’s activities was not of itself a sufficient reason for refusing an injunction.
Allyson Colby is a property law consultant
