PP 2010/144

Section 226(1)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 gives a local planning authority (LPA) the power to acquire land in its area compulsorily if the LPA thinks that the acquisition will facilitate the carrying out of development, redevelopment or improvement on or in respect of the land. Section 226(4) makes it clear that it is immaterial by whom the LPA proposes that development etc should be undertaken. However, the House of Lords held unanimously in Simpson’s Motor Sales (London) Ltd v Hendon Corporation [1964] AC 1088 – on the basis of earlier statutory provisions – that where an LPA obtains a power of compulsory acquisition that is expressed or limited by reference to a particular purpose, it cannot legitimately seek to use the power for some different or collateral purpose. This principle was at the heart of a claim for judicial review in R (on the application of Iceland Foods Ltd) v Newport City Council [2010] EWHC 2505 (Admin); [2010] PLSCS 259. There, the LPA owned the freehold interest in land that it had (with the intention of regeneration) earmarked for a retail-led mixed-use redevelopment including a restaurant, a cinema, a hotel and residential floor space. It entered into a development agreement with a preferred developer and made a compulsory purchase order (CPO) in respect of, inter alia, leasehold interests belonging to the claimant in part of the land. This was subsequently confirmed. It then became apparent that the preferred developer would be unable to meet its obligations under the development agreement. The LPA was concerned to secure ownership of third-party interests in the land in order to safeguard the land’s development potential. It resolved to proceed with the scheme, minus a hotel and without the preferred developer, on the basis of financial support from external sources. It then implemented the CPO and executed a general vesting declaration (GVD).  The claimant sought to quash the CPO and the GVD arguing principally that the LPA had acted unlawfully in making the GVD, because it had taken that step for a purpose that differed from that which had been put forward when the CPO was confirmed. The court rejected this ground of challenge, holding on the facts that there was no basis for concluding that the LPA had implemented the CPO for a purpose that was different from or collateral to the purpose that justified the confirmation of the CPO. (In particular, it was not seeking to accumulate a land bank so as to facilitate some unspecified development in the future as the claimant had sought to contend.) The purpose remained that of carrying out a mixed-use redevelopment scheme on the land. John Martin is a freelance writer