It is well known that a claim for judicial review must be filed “promptly” and in any event not later than three months after the grounds to make the claim first arose. This is the effect of CPR 54, r54.5. However, this has to be read together with section 31(6) of the (now) Senior Courts Act 1981, which provides that where the High Court considers that there has been undue delay in making an application for judicial review the court may refuse to grant: (a) leave for the making of the application or (b) any relief sought on the application if it considers that the granting of relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be “detrimental to good administration”.
In R (on the application of Corus (t/a Orb Electrical Steels)) v Newport City Council [2010] EWHC 1279 (Admin); [2010] PLSCS 157, the claimant applied to the court to quash the grant of planning permission by the defendant to itself for the change of use of land adjoining the claimant’s premises to use as a temporary gypsy traveller site for one family for a period of two years. It contended that, because of a number of flaws in the planning officer’s report to the defendant’s planning committee, the defendant had failed to take into account certain material considerations. The defendant argued that the claim should not be allowed to proceed because of the claimant’s undue delay in bringing it.
The court concluded that the claimant’s delay did not justify a refusal of permission to bring the claim. It had proper grounds for a successful challenge, and the defendant also had been guilty of delay. The judge also held that the defendant had failed to have regard to material considerations and that there were grounds for quashing the grant of planning permission.
However, the court declined to grant the relief sought. The position of the gypsy family, which was untainted by the defendant’s illegality, was relevant when considering the appropriateness of a quashing order. It might reasonably have assumed that the prospect of a challenge would recede with the passage of time, and so its rights would be prejudiced. Equally, as the planning permission had been granted for a fixed term of two years only, it would not be conducive to good administration if a significant part of that period were taken up with uncertainty whether the family was lawfully entitled to occupy the site.
This provides a reminder that section 31(6) has two distinct limbs.
John Martin is a freelance writer
