Section 17 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 enables either the landowner or the acquiring authority to apply to the local planning authority (LPA) for a certificate of appropriate alternative development (CAAV) in respect of the land being acquired. The purpose of a CAAV is to assist in the assessment of compensation. (It has been described as a “hypothetical planning permission”.)
Section 15(5) requires it to be assumed that where a CAAV has been issued, planning permission for any development referred to in the CAAV would have been granted had the land not been compulsorily acquired. A right of appeal against a CAAV lies to the secretary of state and judicial review may also be available in given cases. The question that arose in Kingsley v Highways Agency [2010] UKUT 309 (LC); [2011] PLSCS 5 was the effect of any further CAAV that either party might obtain in respect of the same land.
In Kingsley, the landowner had served a blight notice on the acquiring authority in respect of 32 acres of agricultural land in his ownership that was affected by proposals for a new trunk road. This gave rise to a deemed acquisition of the land, and in response to the landowner’s application, the LPA issued a CAAV indicating that planning permission would have been granted for an equestrian centre together with a country club comprising golf and fishing facilities, tennis courts, a bowling green and an outdoor swimming pool. The acquiring authority took no steps to appeal or challenge the CAAV.
The matter of compensation was referred to the Lands Tribunal. The acquiring authority subsequently sought leave to apply to the LPA for a further CAAV restricted to planning permission for an equestrian centre only, clearly with a view to reducing the likely amount of compensation payable.
The Upper Tribunal refused leave. It held that the requirement in section 15(5) was unqualified, and no question arose of it being negated in whole or part by a later CAAV that specified more limited development. Where two inconsistent CAAVs affected the same land, the Upper Tribunal was not entitled to resolve any inconsistency between them, nor to choose which it preferred. Section 15(5) obliged it to assume the grant of planning permission for the development specified in each. It could not have regard to any negative opinion in either CAAV that conflicted with any such assumption.
John Martin is a freelance writer
