Where an interest in land is proposed to be acquired by an authority possessing compulsory purchase powers, section 17 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 enables both the acquiring authority and the owner of the interest to apply to the local planning authority for what is known as a “certificate of appropriate alternative development” (CAAD). The applicant is required to specify any classes of development it considers would have been appropriate, had there been no compulsory acquisition. The only purpose of the CAAD is to assist in the valuation of the interest, by specifying the development that would have been permitted on the land in those circumstances. On the issue of a CAAD, a right of appeal lies to the Secretary of State.
In Haringay Meat Traders Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2012] EWHC 1744 (Admin); [2012] PLSCS 145 the claimant’s land was subject to a compulsory purchase order as part of the site for the 2012 Olympic Games. The local planning authority, on the application of the claimant, issued a positive CAAD but refused to include a number of the uses specified by the claimant in its application. On appeal, the Secretary of State upheld the local planning authority’s decision, on the recommendation of his inspector.
The claimant applied to quash the Secretary of State’s decision under section 21 of the 1961 Act, contending principally that the inspector had erred in his approach to the development plan. One issue between the parties was the interaction between section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 – requiring planning determinations to be made in accordance with the development plan unless material considerations indicate otherwise – and section 17(7) of the 1961 Act – providing that incompatibility of a use class with the development plan was not, in itself, a reason for treating the use as inappropriate.
The court held that the application for a CAAD had to be considered in the same way as an application for planning permission. It fell to be decided on normal planning principles, with the consequential application of section 38(6). Section 17(7) was not inconsistent with this. It simply reminded the decision maker that the development plan was not the “be all and end all”. Both provisions enabled the decision maker to depart from the development plan, where appropriate, but only in accordance with normal planning principles. The inspector, accordingly, had not erred in his approach to the development plan.
John Martin