In Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead v Smith [2012] EWCA Civ 997, the appellant authority had obtained an injunction retraining the respondent from causing or allowing “any further caravans (which term includes mobile homes)” to be brought onto an area of agricultural land beyond the 10 caravans already stationed on the land. It later applied to commit the respondent for breach of the injunction when a portable building on wheels was delivered to the site. It was originally divided into three shower cubicles and two toilets. The respondent took out the partitions, retaining one shower cubicle and one toilet. She installed windows, tiled the floor and installed a freezer, tumble dryer, sink and table top for ironing. Its use was solely as a utility unit. The issue for the Court of Appeal was whether, for the purposes of the injunction, the unit was a “caravan” with the result that the injunction had been breached.
The appellant argued that the word “caravan” in the injunction had the same meaning as in section 29(1) of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960, where it is defined to mean “any structure designed or adapted for human habitation which is capable of being moved from one place to another (whether by being towed or by being transported on a motor vehicle or trailer)…”. Its counsel further submitted that the unit had been adapted to be inhabited as living space, whether or not for sleeping or eating and irrespective of whether or not it was actually being used for any particular purpose.
In Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead v Smith [2012] EWCA Civ 997, the appellant authority had obtained an injunction retraining the respondent from causing or allowing “any further caravans (which term includes mobile homes)” to be brought onto an area of agricultural land beyond the 10 caravans already stationed on the land. It later applied to commit the respondent for breach of the injunction when a portable building on wheels was delivered to the site. It was originally divided into three shower cubicles and two toilets. The respondent took out the partitions, retaining one shower cubicle and one toilet. She installed windows, tiled the floor and installed a freezer, tumble dryer, sink and table top for ironing. Its use was solely as a utility unit. The issue for the Court of Appeal was whether, for the purposes of the injunction, the unit was a “caravan” with the result that the injunction had been breached. The appellant argued that the word “caravan” in the injunction had the same meaning as in section 29(1) of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960, where it is defined to mean “any structure designed or adapted for human habitation which is capable of being moved from one place to another (whether by being towed or by being transported on a motor vehicle or trailer)…”. Its counsel further submitted that the unit had been adapted to be inhabited as living space, whether or not for sleeping or eating and irrespective of whether or not it was actually being used for any particular purpose. The appeal judges rejected that approach, holding that the preferable approach in this case was to examine the meaning of the word “caravan” in its ordinary, dictionary sense and then see whether the injunction and its factual context provided any basis for a different or more refined meaning. In ordinary usage the word connoted a dwelling on wheels, which was able to be towed. The wording of the injunction appeared to have in mind the same type of thing as the then existing caravans, which were caravans in the conventional sense. Furthermore, breach of the injunction would give rise to various sanctions, including committal. That made it even more likely that the word “caravan” was intended to carry a clear, conventional meaning which was easily understood and applied, and which was consistent with what was actually present and happening on the ground at the time of the injunction. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. John Martin
