CPR 54.5(1) requires that the claim form in a judicial review action is filed: (a) promptly, and (b) in any event not later than three months after the grounds to make the claim first arose. It is well recognised that these two requirements are separate and independent of each other, and that it is not to be assumed that filing within three months necessarily amounts to filing promptly. It is equally well recognised that, in the case of a challenge to a decision to grant planning permission, time starts to run not from the date of the resolution but from the date on which the planning permission is actually issued. Where a lack of promptness is argued, the court will be particularly concerned to ask whether there was a reasonable objective excuse for filing late and what damage, if any, in terms of hardship or prejudice to third parties has been occasioned.
Delay was also an issue in R (on the application of Halebank Parish Council) v Halton Borough Council – see PP 2012/115 – where the claim was filed three days before the expiry of the three-month period. The local planning authority (LPA), in support of its contention that the claim was not made promptly, argued as follows. Promptness in the case of challenges to planning permissions is especially important. The Uniplex principle did not apply to challenges on domestic law grounds. No explanation for the delay had been given. The claimant had instructed counsel four weeks before the claim was filed. Despite the fact that the developer had said that it would not go ahead with the planning permission in question – but would submit a fresh application – that was not relevant to the delay issue.
The claimant parish council argued in turn that a claimant should not be criticised for delay where it had been making reasonable enquiries of the LPA as to the basis of the decision under challenge. Its solicitors had ceased trading and another firm had to be appointed. The developer’s solicitors were aware throughout of the impending challenge.
The court held that the claim should not fall on the grounds of delay. This was not one of those cases where the effect of waiting for proceedings to be issued had caused any significant prejudice, given the developer’s stated intention not to implement the planning permission. Furthermore, the claimant had given ample notice at an early stage of an impending claim for judicial review, albeit not in respect of two of the main issues.
John Martin is a freelance writer
