PP 2012/133

Town and country planning Planning permission 01/10/2012 In R (on the application of Salford Estates (No 2) Ltd) v Durham County Council [2012] EWHC 2512 (Admin); [2012] PLSCS 190, a rival developer unsuccessfully sought judicial review of a decision by the local planning authority (LPA) to grant planning permission to Tesco for a food superstore. In simple terms, the principal ground of challenge was that the LPA had failed to carry out a proper assessment of the retail capacity of the area, and that consequently its decision was unlawful and irrational. The claim was dismissed. There is nothing remarkable about the facts of the case, or the decision of the court. However, the judge summarised with great clarity the governing principles in such an instance. 1. The exercise of planning judgment is within the sole province of the LPA, subject to appeal to the Secretary of State. Provided that the LPAs planning committee has regard to all material considerations, it is at liberty as long as it does not lapse into Wednesbury irrationality to give them whatever weight it sees fit or no weight at all. 2. It is a paradigm of the system of planning control in England and Wales that the exercise of planning judgment is that of the LPAs planning committee and not of its officers. It is the members who are answerable to the public, and derive their authority from the public as elected members. 3. The role of the court is simply to judge the legality of the planning process. It is not an appellate court in respect of the planning merits, and it will not countenance of review of the planning arguments advanced before the LPAs planning committee. 4. The threshold of irrationality for the purposes of judicial review is a high one. This is because responsibility for making the decision rests with another party, and not with the court. To justify intervention by the court, the decision under challenge must fall outside the bounds of any decision open to a reasonable decision maker. Of course, similar principles have already been enunciated by the courts in the past in relation to applications under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash the decision of the Secretary of State or his inspector on a planning appeal and the Secretary of State on a call-in. John Martin