It is well established as a matter of planning law that a resolution by a local planning authority (LPA) to grant planning permission does not of itself constitute the grant of planning permission. This comes about only on the issue of the written decision notice of planning permission. Until then, for instance, the resolution is revocable and no rights and obligations as between the LPA and the applicant come into being. Frequently, there will be an interval between the passing of the resolution and the issue of the decision notice.
Section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 obliges an LPA “in dealing with” a planning application to have regard to the provisions of the development plan, so far as material to the application, and to any other material considerations. The Court of Appeal in R (on the application of Kides) v South Cambridgeshire District Council [2002] EWCA Civ 1370; [2002] 4 PLR 66 held that this expression connotes a continuing duty extending up to the issue of the decision notice.
Accordingly, where an officer to whom the role of signing the decision notice had been delegated became aware, or ought reasonably to have become aware, of a new material consideration section 70(2) required the LPA to have regard to it before finally determining the planning application. It would be incumbent upon that officer to refer the application back to the LPA’s planning committee.
This principle was relied on by the appellant in R (on the application of Hinds) v
The Court of Appeal considered its earlier decision in Kides but held that the change of planning policy represented by the intention to abolish RSSs was not, on the facts of the case, a material consideration in the sense of a factor that – when placed in the decision-maker’s scales – could have affected the balance one way or another. The relevant aspects of the RSS were also contained in local plan policy that would survive its abolition.
John Martin is a freelance writer
