The decision in Winchester City Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2013] EWHC 101 (Admin) incidentally issues a reminder of a very basic point of planning law. While section 60(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“the Act”) provides that planning permission granted by a development order – such as the GPDO – may be granted subject to conditions or limitations, section 70(1) of the Act – which allows a local planning authority (“LPA”) to grant planning permission – sanctions the imposition of conditions, but not limitations.
For instance, in I’m Your Man Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1998] 4 PLR 107, the LPA granted planning permission for a stated use of buildings for seven years, but failed to impose a condition requiring that use to be discontinued at the end of that period. The court held that the reference to a period of seven years was a purported attempt to impose a limitation, and that absent a condition the planning permission had effect as a permanent permission.
This reasoning is not restricted to temporal limitations. It can apply to a substantive limitation, as the decision in R (on the application of Altunkaynak) v Northamptonshire Magistrates’ Court [2012] EWHC 174 (Admin); [2012] PLSCS 30 demonstrates. There, the LPA had granted planning permission to the claimant for the use of his premises at number 15b Silver Street Kettering as a hot food takeaway “as an extension to the present premises at number 15”. The claimant subsequently lost possession of those other premises, and the court had to decide whether he continued to enjoy the benefit of the planning permission. The court held that he did, concluding that the words were not valid to limit the way in which the new use of number 15b could be exercised. Again, a condition should have been imposed.
In Winchester City Council, the court had to decide whether the grant of planning permission for a change of use of agricultural land to a “travelling showpeoples’ site” amounted to a limited grant of planning permission of itself, or whether it was an ineffective attempt to impose a limitation on a more general grant. As a matter of construction, the court held that it amounted to the former.
John Martin
