In North Wiltshire District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1992] 3 PLR 113, Mann LJ stated that one important reason why previous appeal decisions are capable of being material, is that like cases should be decided in a like manner to ensure consistency in the process. (The term “like cases” in this context means cases not distinguishable in some relevant aspect.) He also considered it important for the purpose of securing public confidence in the operation of the development control system. This does not mean that like cases must be decided alike. The decision maker must always exercise his own judgment. He is therefore free to disagree with the judgment of another. But before doing so, he ought to have regard to the importance of consistency and give his reasons for departure from the previous decision. This is so whether the decisions relate to the same appeal site, or to two different ones.
However, as demonstrated by the decision in Arun District Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2013] PLSCS 27, this principle will not apply where the earlier appeal decision has been quashed in its entirety. In that case, an inspector had refused planning permission on appeal for residential development, having made various findings as to the effect of the development on a “strategic gap” prescribed, for the protection of the countryside, in development plan policy. His decision was later quashed pursuant to a consent order, and the matter was reheard by a different inspector.
The second inspector, having concluded that the development would not erode the function of the strategic gap, granted planning permission. One of the claimant’s grounds of challenge was that the second inspector had failed to take into account, as a material consideration, the findings and conclusions of the first inspector.
The court held that the findings and conclusions of the first inspector were not a material consideration of which the second inspector was required to take account. This was because the first inspector’s decision had been quashed in its entirety by the court. It would contravene the principle of certainty, and lead to confusion, if parties had to consider whether the findings in a quashed decision continued to apply.
John Martin
