In Tewkesbury Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (see PP 2013/42) the inspector, with whom the Secretary of State had agreed, concluded that although the two sets of residential development proposals conflicted with the development plan, little weight should be given to the plan since it had an end date of 2011 and was outweighed by material considerations. These included the requirement to produce a five-year housing land supply as (then) provided by PPS3 and (later) the NPPF. He also considered that little weight could be given to a joint core strategy on which the local planning authority (“LPA”) was then working with neighbouring authorities, since it was at an early stage and would not be prejudiced by the proposals.
One of the grounds of challenge advanced by the claimant under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 was that the new statutory regime of the Localism Act 2011 (“the 2011 Act”) created a fundamental requirement that the LPA should take the lead in spatial planning for its area through its responsibility for establishing a local development plan. Accordingly, much greater priority should be given to the views of the LPA than under the previous statutory regime. Counsel for the claimant did not point to any specific provisions of the 2011 Act in this respect, but rather to broad statements made by government ministers as to what the 2011 Act was supposed to do in terms of eliminating “top down” planning and transferring power to local communities.
The court dismissed the claim, the judge initially commenting that it was not sufficient to refer in general terms to essentially political statements as to the radical nature of any proposed change in law or policy. He went on to hold that the 2011 Act had not brought about any fundamental change in the proper approach to planning applications, so as to vitiate the Secretary of State’s conclusions. Furthermore, to lay down a rule as to the weight to be given to the views of the LPA, rather than leaving such matters to the planning judgement of the Secretary of State or his inspector, would contradict a fundamental principle of planning law.
John Martin
