PP 2013/44 In limited circumstances, alternative development proposals are capable of constituting a material planning consideration but the weight to be accorded to them must be balanced against the likelihood of such development actually taking place
When assessing whether a decision maker erred in law in relation to the competing merits of an alternative development proposals for the application site, the court will intervene only exceptionally, given the degree of planning judgment involved. This is even more so where the original proposals are acceptable in planning terms.
In Mount Cook Land v Westminster City Council [2003] EWCA Civ 1364; [2004] 1 PLR 29 the court accepted a number of propositions that may be summarised as follows. (1) In the context of planning control, a person may do what he wants with his land provided his use of it is acceptable in planning terms. (2) There may be a number of alternative uses from which he could choose, each of which would be acceptable in planning terms. (3) Whether any proposed use is acceptable in planning terms depends on whether it would cause planning harm, judged according to any relevant planning policies. (4) In the absence of planning harm, the relative advantages of alternative uses are normally irrelevant in planning terms. (5) Where an application proposal involves no planning harm and includes some enhancement, any alternative proposals are normally irrelevant. (6) Even, in exceptional circumstances where alternative proposals might be relevant, schemes that are vague or unlikely to have any real possibility of coming about would not be relevant or, if they were, should be given little or no weight.
When assessing whether a decision maker erred in law in relation to the competing merits of an alternative development proposals for the application site, the court will intervene only exceptionally, given the degree of planning judgment involved. This is even more so where the original proposals are acceptable in planning terms. In Mount Cook Land v Westminster City Council [2003] EWCA Civ 1364; [2004] 1 PLR 29 the court accepted a number of propositions that may be summarised as follows. (1) In the context of planning control, a person may do what he wants with his land provided his use of it is acceptable in planning terms. (2) There may be a number of alternative uses from which he could choose, each of which would be acceptable in planning terms. (3) Whether any proposed use is acceptable in planning terms depends on whether it would cause planning harm, judged according to any relevant planning policies. (4) In the absence of planning harm, the relative advantages of alternative uses are normally irrelevant in planning terms. (5) Where an application proposal involves no planning harm and includes some enhancement, any alternative proposals are normally irrelevant. (6) Even, in exceptional circumstances where alternative proposals might be relevant, schemes that are vague or unlikely to have any real possibility of coming about would not be relevant or, if they were, should be given little or no weight. The claimant in R (on the application of Watson) v London Borough of Richmond upon Thames [2012] EWHC 3881 (Admin) unsuccessfully sought judicial review of a decision by the local planning authority (“LPA”) of its decision to grant planning permission for a comprehensive redevelopment of Twickenham railway station. The claimant represented a local action group, which had commissioned professional advisers to prepare alternative development proposals referred to as “Plan B”. These were submitted to the LPA. The claimant argued, as one of his grounds, that the LPA had failed to take into account, properly or at all, Plan B. Applying the Mount Cook propositions, the court dismissed the claim. Given that the original proposals did not conflict with the development plan, and that the LPA concluded that they would not cause harm to the townscape and the built environment, there was no requirement to consider alternatives such as Plan B. John Martin
