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PP 2013/60 The statutory power to correct a decision letter of the Secretary of State or one of his inspectors is exercisable only within a strict time limit

Section 56(1) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 (“the Act”) empowers the Secretary of State, or his inspector, (as the case may be) to correct an error in a decision letter that falls within the definition of “correctable error” as set out in section 59(1) of the Act. This refers to an error “which is contained in any part of the decision document which records the decision, but which is not part of the reasons given for the decision”.


He may do so on his own initiative, or at the request of any person, but in either case the process must be initiated during the period in which a High Court challenge may be brought, ie six weeks. Failing that, or a High Court challenge, the original decision notice must stand. Section 58(1) of the Act provides that the effect of issuing a correction notice is that the original decision is taken not to have been made, and is replaced for all purposes by the correction notice. 


(It has been suggested by commentators, however, that the statutory power is very much in the nature of a “slip rule”.)


In Westminster City Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2013] EWHC 675 (Admin) an inspector had granted planning permission on appeal, subject to conditions. The local planning authority (“LPA”) took the view immediately that the form in which the inspector had framed those conditions in his decision letter rendered them unenforceable, in that the specified timetable for compliance with the requirements set out in the conditions did not, in fact, form part of the conditions. Well within six weeks of the date of the decision letter, it requested the Planning Inspectorate (“PINS”) to issue a correction notice. PINS refused to do so, contending that the timetable was effectively incorporated into the conditions, and that accordingly no error had been made.


The LPA had wisely commenced proceedings in the High Court within the six weeks period, and so the issue came before the court. The judge concluded that the LPA was wrong in its assertions, and that PINS was correct. Read as a whole, the conditions did clearly incorporate the timetable for compliance, and on that basis were entirely enforceable.



John Martin

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