Planning appeal – Decision letter – Reasons – Respondent alleging that refusal of planning permission breaching agreement with local planning authority pursuant to which previous use of land discontinued – Respondent relying on personal circumstances and breach of human rights to justify grant of permission on appeal – Inspector dismissing appeal – Decision letter not explaining conclusions reached on factual dispute as to existence of agreement –Whether judge erring in law in concluding that reasons inadequate – Appeal allowed The respondent applied to the local council for planning permission for residential development. The proposed development involved the demolition of buildings connected with the previous use of the site as an intensive pig-rearing unit and the construction of six houses with triple garages. The council refused permission and the respondent appealed to the appellant’s inspector. Before the inspector, there was a factual dispute about how the former pig-rearing use had ended. The respondent had given an undertaking to cease that use in the light of the council’s concerns about the site’s continued suitability for intensive pig-rearing. The respondent alleged that the undertaking was part of a deal under which the council had agreed to permit an alternative use of the site. It argued that the council had unreasonably refused proposals for development, in breach of the agreement, and contrary to the site owner’s right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights. The inspector upheld the refusal of planning permission on grounds relating to incompatibility with development plan policy, impact on an area of outstanding natural beauty, lack of accessibility and highway safety issues. He noted the parties’ disagreement as to the reason for cessation of the pig-rearing operation, stated that the respondent’s personal circumstances were insufficient to outweigh the harm of the proposed development, and concluded that the dismissal of the appeal would not be disproportionate. The respondent brought proceedings to quash the inspector’s decision under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The judge allowed that claim, holding that the inspector had failed to give adequate reasons for his conclusions, which had caused substantial prejudice to the respondent since it could not properly assess its prospects of a successful legal challenge to the inspector’s decision without knowing the evidential basis on which it was made: [2012] EWHC 2043 (Admin); [2012] PLSCS 173. The appellant appealed. Held: The appeal was allowed. The inspector was under a duty to give intelligible and adequate reasons for his decision. His decision had made it perfectly clear what he had found and why and had been adequately reasoned: South Bucks District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953 and R (on the application of Save Britain’s Heritage) v No 1 Poultry Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 153; [1991] EGCS 24 applied. The inspector had decided that the maintenance of the character of the area and the pursuit of highway safety were legitimate aims and that refusal of planning permission was the only way to safeguarding those aims. It necessarily followed that the personal circumstances of the respondent could not outweigh those aims, even if the alleged agreement with the council existed, which was precisely the conclusion that the inspector reached. By a fair reading of the inspector’s decision, in context, it was implicit that he had decided that, even if the respondent’s factual assertions were correct, the personal circumstances would not and could not outweigh the very substantial harm that would be caused by the development. It was impossible to see how that conclusion could be any different, even if the inspector had explicitly decided that the respondent had entered into the agreement as alleged. The alleged agreement, made by an assistant manager in the council’s planning department, could not bind the council and could not bind the inspector in any way. It was clear why he had decided the appeal in the way he did and he had given adequate reasons for his decision, which would be restored. Stephen Whale (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the appellant; Simon Pickles (instructed by Rylatt Chubb) appeared for the respondent. Eileen O’Grady, barrister
Proudfoot Properties v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and another
Planning appeal – Decision letter – Reasons – Respondent alleging that refusal of planning permission breaching agreement with local planning authority pursuant to which previous use of land discontinued – Respondent relying on personal circumstances and breach of human rights to justify grant of permission on appeal – Inspector dismissing appeal – Decision letter not explaining conclusions reached on factual dispute as to existence of agreement –Whether judge erring in law in concluding that reasons inadequate – Appeal allowed
The respondent applied to the local council for planning permission for residential development. The proposed development involved the demolition of buildings connected with the previous use of the site as an intensive pig-rearing unit and the construction of six houses with triple garages. The council refused permission and the respondent appealed to the appellant’s inspector.
Before the inspector, there was a factual dispute about how the former pig-rearing use had ended. The respondent had given an undertaking to cease that use in the light of the council’s concerns about the site’s continued suitability for intensive pig-rearing. The respondent alleged that the undertaking was part of a deal under which the council had agreed to permit an alternative use of the site. It argued that the council had unreasonably refused proposals for development, in breach of the agreement, and contrary to the site owner’s right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights.
The inspector upheld the refusal of planning permission on grounds relating to incompatibility with development plan policy, impact on an area of outstanding natural beauty, lack of accessibility and highway safety issues. He noted the parties’ disagreement as to the reason for cessation of the pig-rearing operation, stated that the respondent’s personal circumstances were insufficient to outweigh the harm of the proposed development, and concluded that the dismissal of the appeal would not be disproportionate. The respondent brought proceedings to quash the inspector’s decision under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
The judge allowed that claim, holding that the inspector had failed to give adequate reasons for his conclusions, which had caused substantial prejudice to the respondent since it could not properly assess its prospects of a successful legal challenge to the inspector’s decision without knowing the evidential basis on which it was made: [2012] EWHC 2043 (Admin); [2012] PLSCS 173. The appellant appealed.
Held: The appeal was allowed.
The inspector was under a duty to give intelligible and adequate reasons for his decision. His decision had made it perfectly clear what he had found and why and had been adequately reasoned: South Bucks District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953 and R (on the application of Save Britain’s Heritage) v No 1 Poultry Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 153; [1991] EGCS 24 applied.
The inspector had decided that the maintenance of the character of the area and the pursuit of highway safety were legitimate aims and that refusal of planning permission was the only way to safeguarding those aims. It necessarily followed that the personal circumstances of the respondent could not outweigh those aims, even if the alleged agreement with the council existed, which was precisely the conclusion that the inspector reached. By a fair reading of the inspector’s decision, in context, it was implicit that he had decided that, even if the respondent’s factual assertions were correct, the personal circumstances would not and could not outweigh the very substantial harm that would be caused by the development.
It was impossible to see how that conclusion could be any different, even if the inspector had explicitly decided that the respondent had entered into the agreement as alleged. The alleged agreement, made by an assistant manager in the council’s planning department, could not bind the council and could not bind the inspector in any way. It was clear why he had decided the appeal in the way he did and he had given adequate reasons for his decision, which would be restored.
Stephen Whale (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the appellant; Simon Pickles (instructed by Rylatt Chubb) appeared for the respondent.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister