Planning permission — Extension to residential property — General development order — Previous refusal of planning permission — Whether planning committee bound by previous decision — Claim allowed
The interested party (D) was the owner of a property comprising a two-storey semi-detached house with a garden. He applied to the defendant council for planning permission to erect a single-storey rear extension, a two-storey side extension and a roof extension and to make internal rearrangements. The council’s planning officer recommended to the planning committee that planning permission be granted, subject to conditions.
The claimants owned and occupied one of the neighbouring residential properties. They objected to the proposed development, arguing, inter alia, that it would have an adverse effect upon the character of the area and upon the amenities of the claimants’ property. Prior to this challenge, the council had twice refused planning permission in respect of the same property for similar proposals that would have resulted in a second separate residential unit being built.
The present application instead involved a single integrated unit.The council resolved to grant planning permission. Their reasons for doing so lay in the planning officer’s report, which had advised that previous refusals had not been made on aesthetic or amenity grounds.
The claimants challenged the validity of the planning permission, contending that: (i) that the planning committee’s decision to grant the permission was based upon a misunderstanding of the reasons as to why the council had previously refused planning permission; (ii) the committee had decided to grant permission without taking proper account of the effect of the proposed development upon the amenities of occupiers of neighbouring properties; and (iii) the council had failed to discharge their statutory duty to give reasons for their decision under article 22 of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure)(England) Amendment Order 1995.
Held: The claim was allowed.
The decision to grant planning permission should be quashed because, in the circumstances, the advice and information that had been provided to the committee might have led them to believe that they were bound by the previous planning decisions and the grounds of refusal that were promulgated in those earlier decisions.
In dealing with any planning application, the planning authority had to have regard to the terms of the development plan and any other material considerations. Planning decisions were not subject to a system of binding precedent. Each case had to be considered on its merits, having regard to all material considerations, including the planning history of the site: Spackman v Secretary of State for the Environment [1977] 1 All ER 257 considered.
Local authorities were not bound to follow their previous decisions or conclusions on matters of planning judgment. However, if they intended to reverse such a decision or conclusion, in the absence of any relevant and significant change in planning circumstances, they were under pressure to explain and justify that course of action: Wiltshire District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1992] 3 PLR 113 considered.
In most cases, article 22 of the 1995 Order required a committee to give a separate summary of reasons for their decision. The present case showed that simply to refer the public or interested parties to the planning application report and to the minutes of the planning committee meeting was insufficient to comply with that requirement or to shed proper light on how the decision had been reached.
Daniel Kolinsky (instructed by Richard Buxton, of Cambridge) appeared for the claimant; Tim Mould (instructed by Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council) appeared for the defendants.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
