Town and country planning – Planning permission – Area of great landscape value – Appellant local authority granting planning permission for development of caravan site – Judge quashing decision on application of respondent parish councillor – Appellant appealing – Whether appellant entitled to grant planning permission within designated area of great landscape value where proposal conflicted with development plan policies – Appeal allowed
The interested party owned the Sun Haven Valley Caravan Park at Mawgan Porth in Newquay, Cornwall. He applied for planning permission to use land to the east of the caravan site for 15 static holiday caravans and 15 holiday lodges, with access and car parking. The development would extend the existing caravan site, about 2.7 hectares, with 100 pitches for caravans and tents and 39 static caravans, on to an adjacent field of 1.6 hectares. The site was in an area of great landscape value (AGLV).
The planning officer’s report referred to policy 14 of the Restormel Local Plan (RLP), which prohibited development that would harm an AGLV. It also referred to policies 5 and 23 of the Cornwall Local Plan (CLP), which concerned development promoting tourism and development affecting the landscape. The parish council objected to the proposal but the appellant local authority decided to approve the proposal at a meeting of its planning committee, which decided that, although extending the caravan park would conflict with the landscape protection policies in policy 14 and policy 23, it complied with the tourism support policy in policy 5 and accorded with the development plan as a whole.
The respondent parish councillor applied for judicial review of that decision and a deputy judge quashed the grant of planning permission: [2019] EWHC 1022 (Admin).
The appellant appealed. The basic question was whether the appellant erred in law in granting planning permission for the development, which it had found to be in conflict with development plan policies for the protection of AGLVs but compliant with other relevant policies and thus in accordance with the plan as a whole.
Held: The appeal was allowed.
(1) Development plans contained broad statements of policy. The decision-maker had to understand the relevant provisions of the plan, recognising that they might sometimes pull in different directions. Section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 required planning authorities to make planning determinations in accordance with the development plan, unless material considerations indicated otherwise. It did not prescribe the way in which the decision-maker was to go about discharging the duty; however, it could only be properly performed if the decision-maker, in the course of making the decision, established whether or not the proposal accorded with the development plan as a whole, bearing in mind the relative importance of the policies and the extent of the compliance or breach. A planning authority’s exercise of its judgment in that respect could only be challenged on the grounds of irrationality or perversity: R v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council, ex parte Milne [2000] EWHC 650 (Admin) and Edinburgh City Council v Secretary of State for Scotland [1997] 3 PLR 71 applied. Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee City Council [2012] UKSC 13; [2012] PLSCS 69, R (on the application of TW Logistics Ltd) v Tendring District Council [2013] 1 EGLR 83, BDW Trading Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2016] EWCA Civ 493, Gladman Developments Ltd v Canterbury City Council [2019] EWCA Civ 669; [2019] PLSCS 74 and Chichester District Council v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2019] EWCA Civ 1640 followed.
(2) On their correct interpretation, the relevant policies of the development plan were pointing in different directions. Policy 5, supportive of new “tourism… accommodation”, worked in favour of the proposal. Policy 23 and saved policy 14 of the RLP, unfavourable to development harmful to the AGLV, worked against it. It was for the appellant planning authority to decide which policy should be given greater weight in the particular decision. The appellant had correctly understood the relevant policies of the development plan and applied those policies lawfully in considering whether the proposal accorded with the plan as a whole. It was not for the judge to form a view on the extent and significance of the breach of policy 14, as if that were a matter of his own planning judgment and not the appellant’s as decision-maker. The appellant did not misunderstand the policy or misapply it. The planning officer accepted there was a breach of policy but concluded that approving the proposal would be a decision taken in accordance with the development plan as a whole. She was clearly aware of the need for planning judgment to be exercised on that question if the appellant was to perform its duty under section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to have regard to the provisions of the development plan, so far as material to the application and other material considerations, and its duty under section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 to make the determination in accordance with the plan unless material considerations indicated otherwise.
(3) The planning officer’s reasoning towards her conclusion that the proposal should be approved did not fall short of what was required. When the adequacy of a planning officer’s report to committee was in question, the court did not expect to find a flawless discussion of every planning issue. She identified the relevant policies of the development plan, evidently understood those policies correctly, applied them lawfully, addressed the other material considerations and guided the committee appropriately in discharging their statutory duties. The assessment and advice in her report were legally sound. Accordingly, the judge was wrong to hold that the proposal’s conflict with policy 14 prevented the appellant from concluding, on the officer’s advice, that a decision to approve it was in accordance with the development plan.
(4) The planning officer had advised the committee on the assumption that a condition would be imposed on the permission, restricting the accommodation on the caravan park to holiday use. The appellant had not misconceived the relevant policies of its plan and did not apply them unlawfully. Its decision was clearly explained in the officer’s report and the grant of planning permission should not have been quashed.
James Findlay QC and Sancho Brett (instructed by Cornwall Council) appeared for the appellant; Ashley Bowes (instructed by TLT Solicitors LLP) appeared for the respondent; the interested party did not appear and was not represented.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
Click here to read a transcript of R (on the application of Corbett) v Cornwall Council
