Development – Planning permission – Material change of use – Defendant local authority granting conditional planning permission for change of use from agricultural to caravan site – Claimant applying for judicial review claiming inadequate reasons for decision – Whether defendants failing to give adequate reasons – Application granted
The interested party operated a family farm on a site situated in the green belt in Wakefield. She applied to the defendant local planning authority for planning permission for a change of use of the land from agricultural field to 20 pitch caravan and camping site, including residential use of land for a manager’s mobile home, construction of a shed, improvements to vehicular access, provision of hard standing and a dustbin/recycling area.
A report by the defendants’ planning officer noted that the change of use was inappropriate development in the green belt area and that it could only be justified if very special circumstances outweighed the harm to the green belt. He recommended planning permission for change of use from agricultural field to a 20 pitch caravan and camping site but not for the residential development.
However, the defendants approved the application in full.
The claimant, a neighbour who lived about 200 metres from the appeal site, applied for judicial review of that decision on the grounds of: (i) failure to give adequate reasons for their decision to grant planning permission contrary to their duty under article 31 of the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2010 (SI 2010/2184); and (ii) failure properly to interpret or take account of green belt policy under the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF).
Prior to the hearing of the application, the defendants indicated that they agreed to the making of a consent order for the quashing of the planning permission on the basis of failure to give adequate reasons. However, the claimant did not agree and disputed both grounds. The main issue was whether the reasons were adequate given the planning officer’s conclusion that very special reasons did not exist.
Held: The application was granted.
Only summary reasons were required for the grant of permission in stark contrast to the requirement for full reasons where permission was refused. Such summary reasons did not present a full account of the local planning authority’s decision making process but were a summary of the outcome of that process.
Moreover, summary reasons were not to be equated with fuller reasons required in a secretary of state’s decision letter. When considering whether summary reasons were adequate, it was necessary to have regard to the surrounding circumstances. Where members of the local planning authority followed the recommendation of a planning officer to grant permission, a relatively brief summary of reasons might well be sufficient; on the other hand, where the members granted permission contrary to the advice of a planning officer to refuse, a fuller summary of reasons might well be necessary or appropriate.
In the latter case, a member of the public with an interest in challenging the lawfulness of planning permission would not necessarily be able to ascertain from the officer’s report whether, in granting planning permission, the members correctly interpreted the local policies and took all relevant matters into account and disregarded irrelevant matters: R (on the application of Ling (Bridlington) Ltd) v East Riding of Yorkshire Council [2006] EWHC 1604 (Admin) and R (on the application of Siraj) v Kirklees Metropolitan Council [2010] EWCA Civ 1286 applied.
Where members granted permission contrary to an officer’s recommendation, the reasons had to contain a summary explanation of the reasons for the grant of permission. The reasons should also contain a summary explanation of the reasons why members disagree with the reasoning in the officer’s report which led to that recommendation.
A relatively brief summary was sufficient, where there was no indication of disagreement with the reasoning in the officer’s report. Where there was disagreement, the fuller summary reasons had to include reasons for that disagreement. In such a case, there had to be a rational and discernible basis for members to reject the officers’ advice. Article 31 of the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2010 (SI 2010/2184) did not require a summary of the reasons for rejecting objections to the grant of permission, i.e. third party objections made in the course of the planning application process, and not the planning officer’s reasons for recommending refusal: R (on the application of Cherkley Campaign Limited) v Mole Valley District Council [2013] EWHC 2582 (Admin); [2013] PLSCS 217 considered.
The normal remedy for failure to provide adequate reasons was to quash the underlying substantive decision which served the dual purpose of encouraging rigorous decision making and avoiding the risks associated with “after the event” reconstruction of reasons. Alternative remedies included an order for a statement of the reasons or merely a declaration that the authority breached its statutory duty to provide summary reasons. Quashing might be refused where it was clear that, upon reconsideration, the substantive decision would be the same. The relevant prejudice to the applicant for relief was the inability to understand whether there might be grounds to challenge the substantive decision.
Prejudice to the beneficiary of the decision might be a relevant factor in the exercise of discretion on remedy: R v Westminster City Council ex parte Ermakov [1996] 2 All E R 302, Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies [2000] 1 WLR 377, R (on the application of Wall) v Brighton and Hove City Council [2004] EWHC 2582 (Admin; [2004] 4 PLR 115, R (on the application of Macrae) v Herefordshire District Council [2012] EWCA Civ 457 and R (on the application of Prideaux) v Buckinghamshire County Council [2013] EWHC 1054 (Admin); [2013] PLSCS 129 considered.
In the present case, where the planning officer’s report had given detailed reasons for concluding that very special circumstances did not exist and where he had effectively reached that conclusion on two distinct occasions, fuller summary reasons were necessary and the planning committee was required to give a summary of its reasons why they did not accept his recommendation nor his reasons. It had not done so. A consideration of all relevant material led to the conclusion that it had not been possible for the interested party, or any relevant third party, to ascertain from the reasons given whether the defendants had properly interpreted or applied the “very special circumstances” test, and what considerations it had or had not take into account.
Accordingly, in breach of their duty under article 31(1)(a)(i) of the 2010 Order, the defendants had failed to give an adequate summary of their reasons for granting permission and their decision had to be quashed.
Zack Simons (instructed by Richard Buxton Environmental and Public Law Solicitors) appeared for the claimant; The defendants did not appear and were not represented; Robert C Smith (by direct access) appeared for the interested party.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
