Appellants sending notice of intention to institute nuisance proceedings to respondent council landlords – Notices sent to address other than proper address of council – Whether notices validly served – Environmental Protection Act 1990 section 106(5) – Appeals allowed
The appellants in three separate appeals were tenants of the respective councils. The appellants complained of nuisance in respect of their properties and brought proceedings pursuant to section 79(1) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. Each appellant sent a notice in accordance with section 82(6) of the Act, but the notices were sent to addresses other than the proper addresses of the council. In the case of Baker, the notice was addressed to “Birmingham City Council – Section 82 team”; in the case of Ireland, to “The Chief Executive” and in the case of Hall, to “Kingston upon Hull City Council”. At the hearing of the alleged statutory nuisances, and at the present appeal, the respondent councils submitted that section 160(2), 160(3) and 160(4) of the 1990 Act had not been complied with by virtue of each notice having been addressed to the wrong entity and sent to the wrong address, and, thus, not having been properly served. In each case, the appellants submitted that the notices had been served in accordance with section 160(5), as the council had specified an alternative address for the service of such notices. The councils’ submissions were upheld by the magistrates’ court. The appellants appealed on the ground that the notices had been validly served.
Held The appeals were allowed.
The person to be served and, accordingly, the person responsible for specifying an address for service other than the city council’s proper address for the purposes of section 160(5) was the body corporate, namely the city council. Where the person to be served was a body corporate, section 160(3) provided that service “may” be achieved by service on the secretary or clerk. There was no reason, however, on the basis of section 160(3), to interpret section 160(5) as confining the category of persons who could specify an alternative address to persons who were, or equivalent to, the secretary or the clerk. The council in each of the present cases had specified an alternative address within the meaning of section 160(5) of the Act. Each notice was properly served at the specified address, at which someone accepted service on behalf of the council: Leeds v Islington London Borough Council, unreported 29 January 1998, considered.
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Michael Supperstone QC and Michael Singleton (instructed by Harfield Pickering, of Redditch) appeared for the first appellant; Michael Supperstone QC and Michael Singleton (instructed by Sydney Mitchell, of Birmingham) appeared for the second appellant; Michael Supperstone QC and Stephen Knafler (instructed by Roskell Davies & Co, of Walsall) appeared for the third appellant; James Findlay (instructed by the solicitor to Birmingham City Council) appeared for the respondents.
Sarah Addenbrooke, barrister
