Respondent council granting permanent planning permission for airstrip – Applicant challenging validity of grant of permission – Whether council’s decision unreasonable – Application refused
In 1990 the respondent council granted temporary planning permission for use of an airstrip at farmland in Somerset for a period of three years. The applicant was a local resident and objected to the permission. In 1993 the council granted permission for a further three-year period. Two applications for permanent planning permission were made to the council in 1996 and 1997. Both were refused in favour of further grants of temporary permission.
In September 1998 a further application for permanent permission was made. The planning officer’s report recommended approval of the application, subject to conditions. That report was made available to the public and, as a result, the applicant made representations. In response to the points raised by the applicant, the planning officer prepared an updated report for the planning committee. In November 1998 the council granted the application for full permission.
The applicant sought to quash the grant, contending that, on the facts of the present case, the council were under a duty to give reasons but failed to do so. It was submitted that the decision was unreasonable in the light of the planning history of the site, and that the planning officer’s report to the council’s committee made no reference to that history, in particular the council’s two previous refusals of permanent permission. The applicant accepted that there was not a general duty upon the council to give reasons but contended that, in the present case, a rational explanation for such a change of mind was necessary. The applicant further submitted that section 100B of the Local Government Act 1972 (as amended) required copies of any report for a committee meeting to be made available for public inspection at least three clear working days before the meeting. That was not complied with in respect of the officer’s updated report.
Held: The application was dismissed.
1. A planning officer’s report was not to be equated with an inspector’s decision letter. In the case of the officer’s report, one would have expected the planning committee to have a certain degree of local and background knowledge. Accordingly, the planning officer needed to assess how much information to put into the report, to avoid burdening the committee with unnecessary detail. It would have been unrealistic to suggest that the committee members had forgotten the earlier refusals. Further, there was an obvious difference between a grant of planning permission made on the recommendation of the officer and one granted contrary to the officer’s recommendation. Where a grant was contrary to the officer’s recommendation, some explanation would be needed, as it would not be found in the officer’s report. However, in the present case, it could reasonably be inferred that the committee granted permission for the reasons advanced by the officer in his report.
2. Section 100B applied to the officer’s original report, not the updated version. Its purpose was to alert the public to reports to be placed before a committee and allow those affected to make representations. Inevitably, those representations would lead to further input from the officer. That input might be by way of an updated report or might be given orally at the meeting. The updated report did not raise new or complex issues. There was, therefore, no force in the argument that it should not have been considered until three working days had passed.
Rabinder Singh (instructed by Bevan Ashford) appeared for the applicant; Timothy Comyn (instructed by the solicitor for Mendip District Council) appeared for the respondents.
Sarah Addenbrooke, barrister
