Supermarket development — Planning permission granted by development corporation as planning authority — Allegation of bias by corporation members — Application for judicial review — Continued presence of members presented no real danger of influencing decision making process — Application dismissed
Kirkstall Valley lies a mile from Leeds city centre on the River Aire. Although high density housing existed to both sides of it, the valley floor was relatively undeveloped. It included, in an L-shaped area of land, three rugby pitches which at all relevant times were owned by Headingly Football Club, and a sports ground. The Leeds City Council’s 1972 development plan allocated the area correspondingly for public open spaces, playing fields and associated amenities. The valley was within the remit of Leeds Development Corporation which differed from the city council as to the best plan for the future of the valley. The regeneration of the area as part of the corporation’s remit and they resolved to grant planning permission for retail development of a supermarket on the pitch forming the foot of the “L”. In 1995 the corporation was wound up and their property, rights and liabilities were transfered to the Secretary of State for the Environment. By regulation 9(1)9c) of the Town and Country Planning (Development Plan) Regulations 1991 the council were required to have regard to the corporation’s policies and proposals. By section 54A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 the corporation, as planning authority were required to have regard to the existing development plan and to conform to it “unless material considerations indicated otherwise.”
The plaintiff was a company limited by guarantee and a community action group concerned with the interests of local residents in the valley development. The applicant sought judicial review of the corporation’s resolution to grant planning permission for the supermarket development. A succession of codes of conduct had been issued for the chairmen and board members of urban development corporations, all of which used the test for bias of what a reasonable observer might think. The applicants argued that the present grant of planning permission was vitiated by apparent bias on the part of three members and an officer of the corporation
Held The application was dismissed.
1. Any direct pecuniary or proprietary interest in the subject-matter of a proceeding, however small, operated as an automatic disqualification. In such a case the law assumed bias. This was the single established special (ie presumptive or automatic) category of disqualification
2. For the rest, the test of bias was whether there was a real danger that the members’ continued presence would influence the decision-making process in favour of the proposal. “Real” meant “not without substance”. A real danger involved more than a minimal risk, less than a probability.
3. The question was whether the interest of the individual was such as to create a real danger that he would instinctively oppose or be in favour of one course rather than another.
4. The principles extended to the generality of decision making bodies governed by the principles of public law, with the particular consequences that the participation of a single member with a disqualifying interest would vitiate the decision arrived at.
5. In this case, in law and on the facts as examined by the court, there was no case for striking down the grant of planning consent on the ground of a disqualifying personal or pecuniary interest.
John Hobson and Paul Stinchcombe (instructed by Brooke, North & Goodwin, of Leeds) appeared for the applicants; Richard Drabble QC and David Elvin and John Litton (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the Secretary of State; Gerard Ryan QC and Jonathan Milner (instructed by Gordons Wright & Wright, of Bradford) appeared for the developers.
