Council seeking Secretary of State’s approval to allow them first opportunity to purchase surplus land – Secretary of State approving sale to council – Applicant objecting – Whether Secretary of State’s decision unreasonable or irrational – Crichel Down Rules 1992 r 14(2) – Application dismissed
The respondent Secretary of State wished to dispose of land that formed part of the former A33 Winchester Bypass. Hampshire County Council (the council) were the highways authority and were granted planning permission to build a park-and-ride car park on the land. There was considerable opposition to the development. Enquiries into purchasing the land were made by the successor in title to the former owner of the land, and a number of local groups, including the Winchester Meadows Conservation Alliance, of which the applicant was a member. A report was sent by the Highways Agency to the minister stating, inter alia, that the council were keen to be given preferential treatment to develop the land. The report referred to r 14(2) of the Crichel Down Rules, which is an exception to the general obligation to offer land back to the former owner. Rule 14(2) applies “Where in very exceptional cases, it is decided on specific Ministerial authority that for strong and urgent reasons of public interest the land should be disposed of as soon as practicable to a local authority or other body with compulsory purchase powers”.
In March 1999 the Secretary of State concluded that he would approve the sale of the land to the council at the full market value. The applicant sought to quash that decision. The central issue was whether the Secretary of State’s decision to apply the exception in r 14(2) was irrational or unreasonable. The applicant contended that the words “very exceptional circumstances” suggested there was a risk to life and limb, for example, where land was required to build sea defences, to protect property or personal safety. The applicant submitted that there was no such risk in this case and no degree of urgency could be shown, therefore, the park-and-ride scheme did not fall within r 14(2).
Held: The application was dismissed.
For a decision to be intrinsically perverse, it had to defy comprehension: R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 306 applied. There was nothing in the words of r 14(2) to imply that the exception could only be made out where the facts implied that life and limb would be at risk. Except in rare cases where the decision did defy comprehension, the question of whether a case was “very exceptional” and there were strong and urgent public interest reasons to justify an exception to the obligation, was a matter of judgment for the decision maker. The Secretary of State asked himself the correct question and there was ample evidence for him to conclude as he did.
Stephen Cragg (instructed by Earthrights, Essex) appeared for the applicant; John Litton (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the respondent.