Reeves (Listing Officer) v Northrop
Rates — Floating vessel – Valuation list – Appellant challenging finding of valuation tribunal that permanently moored vessel used as dwelling was not rateable – Whether vessel constituting hereditament to be included as dwelling in valuation list – Appeal allowed
Since about 2001, the respondent and his family had lived in a vessel which was formerly used as a tugboat but at some stage had been fitted out to provide normal domestic accommodation. It had a galley/kitchen area, a lounge area, a music room, two bedrooms and a bathroom with normal domestic bathroom fittings.
Between 11 December 2008 and October 2011, the vessel was located at a riverside site. When the vessel was first taken there, the site had no formal mooring laid out; it simply rested on the mud flat, although it was secured both front and back to the riverbed or riverbank. Some time after 11 December 2008, the vessel broke free of that mooring and was returned to a slightly different location and secured with lines to stakes and a tyre. The respondent also dug out a mud berth.
The respondent’s occupation of the vessel came to the attention of the appellant listing officer in 2010 when it was the subject of an article in the local paper. Thereafter the vessel was entered into the council tax valuation list with effect from 11 December 2008. The respondent appealed to the valuation tribunal which determined that the entry in the list relating to the vessel should be deleted.
The appellant appealed, arguing that the vessel was properly to be regarded as a hereditament (or part of one) within section 115(1) of the General Rate Act 1967 so that it had properly included as a dwelling in the valuation list. The appellant contended, inter alia, that duration of occupation was the sole determining factor when considering whether the actual occupation of a structure was “not too transient” or “had a sufficient degree of permanency” to qualify as rateable occupation.
Held: The appeal was allowed.
There were four necessary ingredients in rateable occupation: (i) actual occupation; (ii) occupation exclusive for the particular purposes of the possessor; (iii) possession of some value or benefit to the possessor; and (iv) possession for not too transient a period: John Laing & Son Ltd v Assessment Committee for Kingswood Assessment Area [1949] 1 KB 344 applied.
Although the duration of occupation was always an important factor in determining degrees of transience or sufficiency of permanence, the character of the occupation could also have a bearing on those issues in an appropriate case. The issue of whether occupation was “not too transient” or “sufficiently permanent” essentially depended upon an exercise in evaluation and judgment. A rule of thumb had developed to the effect that occupation for more than one year was likely to establish sufficiency of permanence. However, that did not mean that duration was the only criterion by which permanency was to be judged. It was nothing more than an acknowledgement that, once a there was a significant length of occupancy, the likelihood was that sufficiency of permanence would also be proved.
The correct legal position was that duration of occupation would always be an important factor when determining whether occupation should be regarded as “not too transient” or “sufficiently permanent”. No doubt, in practice, there would be cases in which the period of occupation would be, in effect, determinative of the issue of transience or permanency. However, other factors would not necessarily be irrelevant in every case. It could not be said that a court or tribunal would inevitably act unlawfully if it took account of factors other than duration of occupation when resolving the issue of transience or permanency: London County Council v Wilkins [1957] AC 362; Field Place Caravan Park Ltd v Harding [1966] QB 484; Thomas (Valuation Officer) v Whitney Aquatic Co Ltd [1972] RA 493 and Rudd (Valuation Officer) v Cinderella Rockafellas Ltd [2003] PLSCS 88; [2003] 1 WLR 2423 considered.
In the present case, it was common ground that the first three of the four conditions for rateability had been established. However, it was apparent from the plain language used by the tribunal that it had failed to afford proper significance to the duration of occupation. Applying the correct legal test, the appellant had been right in his assertion that the vessel should be entered as a dwelling in the council tax valuation list from 11 December 2008. The vessel had remained in a fixed position for a little more than two years by the time of the appeal before the tribunal. Such a period was consistent only with the conclusion that the length of occupation “was not too transient” or “sufficiently permanent”.
In the context of this case, the mooring arrangements deployed by the respondent were not a relevant consideration in assessing whether the period of occupation was sufficiently permanent. The fact that the vessel was capable of being used as such could not, of itself, lead to a finding of insufficient permanence. Essentially, the vessel had been turned into a dwelling many years ago and had been used as such throughout the whole period of relevant occupation. It was never used as a boat during that period. Accordingly, the entry into the council tax valuation list which was deleted by virtue of the order of the tribunal should be restored.
Galina Ward (instructed by the Solicitor to HM Revenue and Customs) appeared for the appellant; Stephen Knafler QC (instructed by Avon and Bristol Law Centre) appeared for the respondent.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
Rates — Floating vessel – Valuation list – Appellant challenging finding of valuation tribunal that permanently moored vessel used as dwelling was not rateable – Whether vessel constituting hereditament to be included as dwelling in valuation list – Appeal allowed Since about 2001, the respondent and his family had lived in a vessel which was formerly used as a tugboat but at some stage had been fitted out to provide normal domestic accommodation. It had a galley/kitchen area, a lounge area, a music room, two bedrooms and a bathroom with normal domestic bathroom fittings.Between 11 December 2008 and October 2011, the vessel was located at a riverside site. When the vessel was first taken there, the site had no formal mooring laid out; it simply rested on the mud flat, although it was secured both front and back to the riverbed or riverbank. Some time after 11 December 2008, the vessel broke free of that mooring and was returned to a slightly different location and secured with lines to stakes and a tyre. The respondent also dug out a mud berth.The respondent’s occupation of the vessel came to the attention of the appellant listing officer in 2010 when it was the subject of an article in the local paper. Thereafter the vessel was entered into the council tax valuation list with effect from 11 December 2008. The respondent appealed to the valuation tribunal which determined that the entry in the list relating to the vessel should be deleted.The appellant appealed, arguing that the vessel was properly to be regarded as a hereditament (or part of one) within section 115(1) of the General Rate Act 1967 so that it had properly included as a dwelling in the valuation list. The appellant contended, inter alia, that duration of occupation was the sole determining factor when considering whether the actual occupation of a structure was “not too transient” or “had a sufficient degree of permanency” to qualify as rateable occupation. Held: The appeal was allowed.There were four necessary ingredients in rateable occupation: (i) actual occupation; (ii) occupation exclusive for the particular purposes of the possessor; (iii) possession of some value or benefit to the possessor; and (iv) possession for not too transient a period: John Laing & Son Ltd v Assessment Committee for Kingswood Assessment Area [1949] 1 KB 344 applied.Although the duration of occupation was always an important factor in determining degrees of transience or sufficiency of permanence, the character of the occupation could also have a bearing on those issues in an appropriate case. The issue of whether occupation was “not too transient” or “sufficiently permanent” essentially depended upon an exercise in evaluation and judgment. A rule of thumb had developed to the effect that occupation for more than one year was likely to establish sufficiency of permanence. However, that did not mean that duration was the only criterion by which permanency was to be judged. It was nothing more than an acknowledgement that, once a there was a significant length of occupancy, the likelihood was that sufficiency of permanence would also be proved. The correct legal position was that duration of occupation would always be an important factor when determining whether occupation should be regarded as “not too transient” or “sufficiently permanent”. No doubt, in practice, there would be cases in which the period of occupation would be, in effect, determinative of the issue of transience or permanency. However, other factors would not necessarily be irrelevant in every case. It could not be said that a court or tribunal would inevitably act unlawfully if it took account of factors other than duration of occupation when resolving the issue of transience or permanency: London County Council v Wilkins [1957] AC 362; Field Place Caravan Park Ltd v Harding [1966] QB 484; Thomas (Valuation Officer) v Whitney Aquatic Co Ltd [1972] RA 493 and Rudd (Valuation Officer) v Cinderella Rockafellas Ltd [2003] PLSCS 88; [2003] 1 WLR 2423 considered.In the present case, it was common ground that the first three of the four conditions for rateability had been established. However, it was apparent from the plain language used by the tribunal that it had failed to afford proper significance to the duration of occupation. Applying the correct legal test, the appellant had been right in his assertion that the vessel should be entered as a dwelling in the council tax valuation list from 11 December 2008. The vessel had remained in a fixed position for a little more than two years by the time of the appeal before the tribunal. Such a period was consistent only with the conclusion that the length of occupation “was not too transient” or “sufficiently permanent”.In the context of this case, the mooring arrangements deployed by the respondent were not a relevant consideration in assessing whether the period of occupation was sufficiently permanent. The fact that the vessel was capable of being used as such could not, of itself, lead to a finding of insufficient permanence. Essentially, the vessel had been turned into a dwelling many years ago and had been used as such throughout the whole period of relevant occupation. It was never used as a boat during that period. Accordingly, the entry into the council tax valuation list which was deleted by virtue of the order of the tribunal should be restored. Galina Ward (instructed by the Solicitor to HM Revenue and Customs) appeared for the appellant; Stephen Knafler QC (instructed by Avon and Bristol Law Centre) appeared for the respondent. Eileen O’Grady, barrister
