Regentford Ltd v Thanet District Council

Council tax — Liability order — Jurisdiction to make order — Date tax becoming due — Whether date when amount of tax set or date of demand for payment — Appeal dismissed The respondent council applied, under regulation 34 of the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992, for liability orders against the appellant in respect of outstanding council tax on two properties. The justices granted the orders at a hearing at which the appellant was not present. The appellant appealed. It contended that the justices had had no jurisdiction to make the orders because, contrary to regulation 34(3), the council’s application had included amounts becoming due more than six years before the application date. It maintained that council tax became due on the date upon which the council, in the exercise of their power under section 30 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, set the amount of council tax for the forthcoming year. The council argued that the scheme of the legislation drew a distinction between potential liability to council tax and an actual duty to pay, the latter being triggered only upon the service of a demand for payment under regulation 18. The appellant also applied to remit the case to the justices for consideration of a defence that the council had failed to serve a demand notice as soon as was practicable, as required by regulations 18 and 19. Held: The appeal was dismissed. 1. The liability to pay council tax required, for its transformation into a duty to pay, a demand by the billing authority. This was reflected in the scheme of regulations 18 to 22 of the 1992 Regulations. The duty to pay council tax arose only when the demand had been served, and so, in the present case, the full six years’ council tax became due when the liability orders had been made. The justices had had the power to make the order, which were valid and enforceable. 2. The language of regulation 19 admitted of the construction that a breach of the statutory duty by a billing authority did not operate in all cases as a windfall to the person liable, but precluded a claim for payment and a duty to pay only when the breach had occasioned some procedural or substantive prejudice. Since the appellant had not attended the hearing before the justices to present its arguments, it should not now be permitted to raise a defence that the council had failed to serve the demand notices as soon as practicable. The appellant’s claim to have suffered prejudice had no force. Its application to remit the case to the justices would be refused. Nicholas Fairbank (instructed by Marsden Douglas, of Margate) appeared for the appellant; Tim Mould (instructed by the solicitor to Thanet District Council) appeared for the respondents. Sally Dobson, barrister