Samuel Smith Old Brewery (Tadcaster) v North Yorkshire County Council

Road Traffic Act 1984 – Local authority relocating Thursday market to two streets – Highway authority making order restricting vehicle traffic at new location on market days – Objector contending that order made for non-highway reasons – Order declared valid As part of their plan to regenerate the centre of Tadcaster, the Selby District Council (SDC) resolved to move the location of an open-air Thursday market from a public car park to two nearby streets, Kirkgate and Westgate. To that end, having applied (to themselves) for planning permission, they made representations to the relevant highway authority (the respondent council), with a view to obtaining an order restricting traffic on those streets on market days. The claimant was a long-established brewery concern which had previously successfully objected to a temporary restriction designed to achieve the same result. In December 1998 the respondent council sent to the claimant a copy of their proposal to make the order, which referred to SDC’s planning application and set out three of the seven reasons by which a traffic regulation order could be made under section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1984. The stated reasons were: the avoidance of danger to road users; the facilitation of vehicular and pedestrian passage; and the preservation or improvement of adjoining areas. The claimant lodged objections. In March 1999 the SDC granted planning permission for the relocation of the market. In October 1999 the respondent council, purporting to act under sections 1 and 2 of the 1984 Act, made an order giving effect to the proposal. The claimant, applying to the court under paragraphs 34-37 of Part VI of Schedule 9 to the 1984 Act, sought to have the order quashed on the grounds that the respondents had, inter alia: (i) acted with the improper or collateral purpose of bringing about the relocation of the market; (ii) in providing for two-way traffic in one of the streets, which had previously been one-way, broken their duty under section 122 of the Act “to secure the expeditious, convenient and safe movement of vehicular and other traffic (including pedestrians)”; and (iii) contravened a prohibition, contained in section 3, against making any order which had the effect of “preventing” vehicular access to adjacent premises for more than eight hours in any period of 24 hours. Held: The application failed. 1. The fact that members of the respondent council were in favour of the relocation of the market did not mean that they had made a highway decision in order to achieve a non-highway purpose. The reasons given were proper highway reasons and had to be accepted as such unless shown to be inapplicable. So long as the purpose fell within the parameters of the 1984 Act, it was immaterial that it would have the consequence of achieving an incidental, albeit desired, consequence: see R v London Boroughs Transport Committee, ex parte Freight Transport Association Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 828 (HL). In considering whether it was “expedient” to make the order, the respondents were bound to have regard to the fact that SDC had obtained planning permission (which was not conditional upon the making of a traffic regulation order), and to look ahead to future events. The words “for avoiding danger” as used in section 1(1)(a) of the Act should be read accordingly: see Encyclopaedia of Highway Law, para 3-1666. 2. The limited provision for two-way traffic did not put the respondents in breach of section 22, which, being qualified by the words “so far as practicable”, did not impose an absolute duty: see St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council v West Lancashire District Council (1997) 95 LGR 484. 3. Although the order prohibited vehicles between 06.00 and 17.00 on Thursdays, it did not contravene section 3(1)(b) of the Act as it expressly exempted vehicles used for conveying persons or goods to or from premises adjacent to the road where an alternative road could not be conveniently used. Thus qualified, the order did not have the effect of “preventing” access within the meaning of the section: see Corfe Transport v >Gwynedd County Council [1984] RTR 79. Nor did the presence of the word “conveniently” render the order void for uncertainty, as that word had an ascertainable meaning and was capable of application in any particular situation: see generally per Simon Brown LJ in Percy v Hall [1996] 4 All ER 523 at p535. Peter Village and Martin Chamberlain (instructed by Pinsent Curtis, of Leeds) appeared for the claimant; Colin Crawford (instructed by the solicitor to the council) appeared for the respondents. Alan Cooklin, barrister