General Rate Act 1967–Council’s resolution to rate unoccupied properties–Resolution did not expressly ‘specify’ date when provisions were to come into operation–Date nevertheless clear from surrounding circumstances–Resolution not invalidated–Authority’s appeal allowed
This was an
appeal by Sheffield City Council from the dismissal by Melford Stevenson J of
its claim for £1,188 from Graingers Wines Ltd, of Allen Street, Sheffield, in
respect of rates for unoccupied premises in their ownership.
Francis Radcliffe
(instructed by Sharpe, Pritchard & Co, agents for Samuel Jones, Sheffield
Council Legal Department) represented the appellants, and Brian McCarthy
(instructed by Lucas Styring & Appleby, of Sheffield) appeared for the
respondents.
Giving
judgment, LORD DENNING said that the City of Sheffield had got into some
trouble. As from April 1 1974 they determined to rate empty commercial
properties. There were some 1,108 unoccupied properties representing a rate
income to the council of £373,289. About £269,997 had been collected for 677
buildings. There was a balance of £103,292 to be paid. Someone connected with
Sheffield Chamber of Commerce said that it was unlawful, that the council had
not got the procedure right and might have to repay what they had collected.
The judge had said that the chamber of commerce were right. The question was
whether the council had complied with all the legal requirements when they set
out to rate unoccupied properties.
Section 17 of
the General Rate Act 1967 as amended provided:
(1) A rating authority may resolve that the
provisions of Schedule 1 to this Act with respect to the rating of unoccupied
property–(a) shall apply . . . to their area, and in that case those provisions
shall come into operation, or, as the case may be, cease to be in operation, in
that area on such a day as may be specified in the resolution. (2) The day to
be specified in a resolution under subsection (1) of this section shall be–(a)
in the case of a resolution providing that the said provisions shall apply to
the area in question, the first day of a rate period for that area beginning
after the day on which the resolution is passed. . . . (3) As soon as may be
after a resolution is passed by a rating authority under this section, the
authority shall cause a copy of the resolution to be published in the London
Gazette and in one or more newspapers circulating in the area of the
authority. (4) A document purporting to be a copy of the minutes of a
resolution passed by a rating authority under section 20 of the Local
Government Act 1966 and to be certified under the hand of the clerk of the
authority as a true copy of the minutes of the resolution shall be evidence
that the resolution was passed by the authority.
So the section
said that unoccupied premises could be rated and that the provisions came into
operation ‘on such day as may be specified in the resolution.’ It was said that the council had not
specified the day in the resolution. If one examined the resolution very
formalistically that might be said to be right. The judge had so held. But
should the resolution and all that followed be interpreted so
formalistically? There had been much
discussion as to whether the provision about the resolution was mandatory or
directory. That was a matter of impression. His Lordship’s impression was that
it was required for the purposes of certainty.
Did the
resolution make sufficiently clear the day from which it was to operate? On March 6 1974 the council’s policy
committee had met and it was pointed out that the resolution to be passed was
to come into operation on April 1 1974. After a debate and a division along
party lines the resolution was passed. The resolution did not include the key
words ‘as from April 1 1974.’ That was
an error by the draftsman. They ought to have been put in. The press had been
present and realised that the resolution would operate from April 1 1974. The
local papers came out with the pronouncement that the rating of unoccupied
premises was to take place straight away. By the time it came for the
publication of the statutory notices under section 17(3) of the Act it was made
quite clear that the resolution would operate from April 1 1974.
The resolution
should not be construed so technically as was suggested. Documents and
transactions were to be construed so as to give them validity and not so that
they should perish or fall–so far as that could reasonably be done. Because of
the mistake it might be that all the ratepayers who had not paid would not have
to pay. Those who had paid might get back what they had paid. The burden would
fall on the ratepayers of Sheffield. The resolution had been passed by members
of the committee and it had been
The formal resolution should be read in the context of the minutes from which
it was clear it was to operate from April 1. That had been made clear in every
publication to the general public and the press. There had been sufficient
compliance with the statute. The appeal should be allowed.
Agreeing, ORR
LJ said that it was the clear intention of the policy committee that the rating
of unoccupied premises should begin on April 1 1974.
Also agreeing,
SCARMAN LJ said that it was perfectly clear that if a power was given to impose
a financial burden on a member of the public, the donee of the power must act
strictly in accordance with the conditions laid down by Parliament. That
principle lay behind the Bill of Rights 1688. It showed the sort of approach
which the courts should make where there was to be a levy of money on the
public. ‘Specified’ in section 17(1) and (2) meant ‘made clear’–see Reid
v Dawson [1955] 1 QB 214, 220. The date on which the resolution was to
come into operation must be made clear. The obligations on the local authority
under subsection (3) had been carried out. The statutory advertisements had
described the resolution as operating from April 1 1974. The resolution was in
the present tense. He (his Lordship) had come to the clear conclusion that the
resolution, properly construed in its surrounding circumstances, specified the
date from which it was to operate and the day from which the provisions were to
be imposed.
The appeal
was allowed. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.
