Park home – Site licence – Compliance notice – Appellant appealing against decision of First-tier Tribunal refusing to quash compliance notices served by respondent local authority pursuant to section 9A of Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 – Whether appellant breaching conditions – Whether service of compliance notices justified – Whether remedial works required being reasonable and proportional to nature of breach – Appeal dismissed
The appellant was the occupier of a caravan site known as the Ladycroft Mobile Home Park, Berry Lane, Blewbury, Didcot, Oxfordshire. It had been the holder of a site licence issued by the respondent council for some years. The site licence was granted subject to the conditions set out in the schedule attached to the licence. The schedule limited the total number of caravans stationed on the site to 60 and stipulated that all caravans should be maintained in a good state of repair. A dispute arose concerning the placing of a caravan or mobile home on plot 61 of the site. The respondent local authority contended that the caravan was too close to the eastern boundary and that it was too close to another caravan. As such, they claimed that the appellants were in breach of two conditions of the site licence.
The appellant appealed against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) (FTT) refusing to quash compliance notices served by the respondents on the appellant pursuant to section 9A of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 which conferred power on local authorities to serve compliance notices on occupiers as an alternative to criminal prosecution. If it appeared to a local authority in England which had issued a site licence in respect of a relevant protected site in their area that the occupier of the land concerned was failing or had failed to comply with a condition for the time being attached to the site licence, they might serve a compliance notice on the occupier.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
(1) In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the FTT could not be criticised for proceeding on the basis that there had been a breach of condition of the site licence.
(2) Section 9A(1) clearly provided that the local authority might serve a compliance notice on the occupier if it appeared to that the occupier was failing or had failed to comply with a licence condition. There was no express reference to any standard of proof (criminal or civil) nor should any be implied. The local authority was not acting in a judicial capacity and adjudicating upon evidence adduced before it by parties to litigation. It did not, in serving a compliance notice, circumvent the criminal standard of proof that would have to be satisfied if it decided to prosecute the site occupier under section 9 for breach of condition. The compliance notice procedure was an alternative course of action to commencing a criminal prosecution. It was intended to be more flexible and could be adapted to the circumstances of the particular case; and in the event of the site occupier complying with the notice, there would be no need to bring criminal proceedings. Criminal prosecution was punitive rather than remedial, less nuanced and likely to be used by local authorities as a last resort where invocation of compliance procedures was inappropriate or had been attempted and had proved to be ineffective. In the event of a criminal prosecution, whether under section 9 (for breach of a licence condition) or under section 9B (for failure to take steps required by a compliance notice), the criminal standard of proof would apply.
(3) The function of the FTT was to conduct a re-hearing, as explicitly stated in section 9G(4) of the 1960 Act. Even if there were a breach of the Model Standards 2008 for Caravan Sites in England or the Best Practice Guide for Local Authorities on Enforcement of the New Site Licensing Regime with regard to consultation with those affected, the FTT had given the occupier and the residents of the home the opportunity to make representations and to have their case heard and their views taken into consideration. Provided that the decision of the FTT did not itself contain any error of law, there were no grounds upon which the Upper Tribunal could intervene.
(4) In the present case, it was clear that the appellant had been seeking to revisit issues which were for the most part decided in the previous proceedings. More particularly, the FTT having decided that it was necessary and reasonable to have a three metre clear strip between the eastern boundary of the site and the nearest caravan, the appellant defied the FTT’s decision by introducing a caravan onto the site such that it would necessarily contravene the boundary stipulation in the site licence. It then sought to challenge an attempt by the respondents to enforce the conditions of the site licence, citing the hardship that would be suffered by the occupiers of the caravan in question should the home have to be moved from the site.
The decision of the FTT had been thorough and comprehensive and there were no flaws which could conceivably justify its being set aside. The FTT directed itself properly in law, took into account relevant considerations and did not take into account irrelevant ones. Moreover, such findings of fact as it made were findings that it was entitled to make. Not only was the decision of the FTT unimpeachable as a matter of law, it was also the right decision to make.
Jon Pyne (Solicitor of Horsey Lightly Fynn, Bournemouth) appeared for the appellant; Peter Savill (instructed by Vale of White Horse District Council) appeared for the respondents.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
