South Gloucestershire Council v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government – Town and country planning – Planning permission – Reasons – Claimant local authority applying to quash decision of the secretary of state allowing developer’s appeal against refusal of planning permission for development – Whether inspector failing to provide adequate reasons for rejecting argument that permission should be refused on ground of prematurity – Application dismissed
The interested party developer was granted outline planning permission for a residential development of 350 dwellings (35% affordable housing), a 70-unit elderly care facility, community and commercial facilities and associated public open space and infrastructure at Cleve Park, Thornbury, Gloucestershire. The site was in the countryside and was 21.97 hectares in total, with a proposed area of development comprising 11.5 hectares. The claimant local planning authority refused outline planning permission on the grounds, amongst other things, that the proposed development was speculative in nature and would not result in a comprehensively planned development.
Following a six-day inquiry, an inspector appointed by the defendant secretary of state allowed an appeal by the interested party and granted planning permission, subject to conditions. The inspector gave substantial weight to the benefit of much-needed housing, together with the economic benefits of jobs and an increased population and concluded that the adverse impacts of granting planning permission would not significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, and so the proposals benefitted from the presumption in favour of sustainable development in para 14 of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF). The conflict with the development plan was outweighed by the other material considerations.
The claimant applied under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash the inspector’s decision. The claimant contended that the inspector failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting its argument that permission should be refused on the ground of prematurity, in the light of the emerging joint spatial plan (JSP) which was to be followed by the emerging South Gloucestershire Local Plan.
Held: The application was dismissed.
(1) The Planning Practice Guidance (PPG) gave guidance on prematurity. In the context of the NPPF, and in particular the presumption in favour of sustainable development, arguments that an application was premature were unlikely to justify a refusal of planning permission other than where it was clear that the adverse impacts of granting permission would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, taking the policies in the NPPF and any other material considerations into account. Such circumstances were likely, but not exclusively, to be limited to situations where both: (a) the development proposed was so substantial, or its cumulative effect would be so significant, that to grant permission would undermine the plan-making process by predetermining decisions about the scale, location or phasing of new development that were central to an emerging Local Plan or Neighbourhood Planning; and (b) the emerging plan was at an advanced stage but was not yet formally part of the development plan for the area. Refusal of planning permission on grounds of prematurity would seldom be justified where a draft local plan had yet to be submitted for examination, or in the case of a neighbourhood plan, before the end of the local planning authority publicity period. Where planning permission was refused on grounds of prematurity, the local planning authority would need to indicate clearly how the grant of permission for the development concerned would prejudice the outcome of the plan-making process.
(2) In the present case prematurity was not a main issue. It was not relied upon by the claimant in its reasons for refusal. At that time, the officer’s report advised members that the JSP was still at a relatively early stage of development and so carried very limited weight. It also advised that the development proposed would not conflict with the emerging JSP proposals since the JSP identified the application site as a likely development location. The issue of prematurity was raised by the claimant in its submissions to the inquiry, on the basis that, with the passage of time, the JSP had now reached an advanced stage. It was anticipated that examination would take place once the plan was submitted. In the event, it was postponed. The claimant argued that it could be considered as an aspect of the first reason for refusal. Thus, although it became an issue at the appeal stage, it was a secondary issue, not a main issue. In his decision, the inspector dealt with it under the heading “Other planning matters”, after consideration of the main issues: Woodcock Holdings Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] JPL 1151; [2015] PLSCS 149 distinguished.
(3) The interested party had conceded that the JSP was at an advanced stage, and so para (b) of the PPG was met. However, it submitted that para (a) of the PPG was not met because the proposed development would not undermine the JSP by pre-determining decisions which were central to it. It was not necessary for the inspector to recite the PPG in his decision. As an experienced inspector, he would have been well aware of it, and he was reminded of it during the inquiry and applied it. The parties were well aware of the competing submissions about prematurity and the application of the PPG. There was no real, as opposed to forensic, doubt as to what the inspector’s reasons were. The claimant’s main challenge was to the substance of the inspector’s reasons, not their adequacy or intelligibility. The way in which the inspector formulated his reasons did not substantially prejudice the claimant. The inspector’s reasons were specific to this application. It was open to the claimant to seek to distinguish this case from other appeals and applications, concerning different proposals, at other sites. The claimant was also entitled to submit that the inspector’s approach to the PPG should not be followed in other cases. The challenge to the adequacy of reasons failed and the application was dismissed.
Alexander Greaves (instructed by Sharpe Pritchard LLP) appeared for the claimant; Richard Honey (instructed by the Government Legal Department) appeared for the defendant; Mark Lowe QC and Jack Parker (instructed by Osborne Clarke) appeared for the interested party.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
