Secure tenancy — Council property — Alternative accommodation — Tenant squatting in property — Possession order — Council officer stating that order not enforced until alternative accommodation offered and unreasonably refused — Council taking possession proceedings eight years later — Occupant claiming contractual right to remain — High Court making possession order — Court of Appeal dismissing appeal against that decision
The appellant (L) lived at 21 Benwick Close, Aspinden Road, London SE16, with her three adult children and her 16-year-old son. One of her adult daughters had a baby, who also lived in the property. Before moving there L lived with her husband and children in a two-bedroomed first-floor flat at 18 Hythe House, London SE11, from 1975. At Hythe House the family were subjected to serious racial harassment. Moreover, the accommodation was inadequate. In 1979 L was placed on the register for a transfer on the basis of overcrowding. The council were allocated half a new development known as the Littlington Street Development, which included Benwick Close. L moved into no 21 with her family on December 31 1985, allegedly as a squatter. The council took steps to regain possession because another family had been offered the property. L refused to leave.
On May 8 1986 an order for possession was made against her, but not enforced at that stage. A council officer wrote to L on August 28 1986 stating, inter alia, that the court order would not be enforced: “unless it is proved that you have been offered a suitable place and have refused it for no good reason”. In August 1994 possession proceedings were started. L claimed that: (a) the letter gave her a contractual right to remain; or (b) the council were estopped from disputing her right to remain and from bringing possession proceedings. The High Court ordered that the council should recover possession of the property. L appealed.
Held The appeal was dismissed.
1. The case in contract was hopeless. No term was agreed as to any payment which L was to make for her occupation of the property. That would have been an essential term of any contract.
2. A forbearance to act could constitute either express or implied consideration sufficient to support a contract. But the forbearance must be at the express or implied request of the other party to the contract. That was not the situation here. L had left 18 Hythe House at the end of December with no intention of returning. No further rent was paid after she left Hythe House and it was no longer the family home. A secure tenancy required a continued occupation.
3. Finally, placing all the council’s responsibilities to all those who sought their assistance in the balance, it would be equitable to allow the council to recover possession of the property. It would not be right to set aside the order for possession. The council had stayed their hand as long as they could because of L’s difficulties.
Elizabeth-Anne Gumbel (instructed by Winston & Co) appeared for the appellant; Nicholas Nicol (instructed by the solicitor to Southwark London Borough Council appeared for the council.
