Appellant converting large family house into flats — Whether property constituting block of flats or house for purposes of sections 352 and 372 of Housing Act 1985 — Appeal dismissed
In 1990, the appellant purchased a semi-detached property. He obtained full planning permission and converted the property into a number of self-contained flats, which he intended to sell on long leases. All but two of the flats were accessed by way of the original front door, entrance hall and stairway.
The respondent local authority served a notice on the appellant, under sections 352 and 372 of the Housing Act 1985, requiring the appellant to carry out works to render the premises fit for the number of inhabitants on the premises and to remedy neglectful management.
The issue to be determined on the appeal was whether sections 352 and 372 applied. The appellant maintained that, for the purposes of the Housing Act 1985, because of the arrangement of the premises and the manner in which it had been divided into self-contained units, it was neither a house nor a house in multiple occupation, but a block of flats. He also claimed, inter alia, that his rights under the European Convention on Human Rights had been breached, in that the extent of the works ordered was disproportionate or unfair and that, if the property were found to be a house in multiple occupation, it would be seriously devalued, effectively depriving him of a possession in contravention of Article 1.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
Section 345(2)(b) defined “house” as a building or any part of a building that was “originally constructed or subsequently adapted for occupation by a single household”. On a proper understanding of the 1985 Act and the finding in Okereke v Brent London Borough Council [1967] 1 QB 42, which contained the same argument as in the instant case, and bearing in mind the internal arrangements of the property, in particular the necessity for each inhabitant to pass through the front door in order to gain access to each flat, the property was indeed a house.
The appellant’s argument, that it was illogical to include within the reach of Part XI blocks of flats that were the result of a conversion since purpose-built blocks of flats appeared to be excluded, must fail. Section 345 did not extend to purpose-built blocks of flats because they were not “originally constructed or subsequently adapted for occupation by a single household”.
While the addition of subsection (2) had extended the definition of “house in multiple occupation”, it had not impliedly limited the extant meaning of subsection (1). Section 345, in its amended form, was intended to: (i) leave in place the existing provision that a house in multiple occupation constituted a “house” occupied by persons who did not form a single household; and (ii) recognise as such houses in multiple occupation parts of any buildings that were no longer houses but that had been originally constructed, or subsequently adapted, for occupation by a single household.
The stringent regime governing the safety of occupants in houses in multiple occupation was a matter of public interest, and the State therefore had a wide discretion to implement that regime. It was unlikely that works ordered by the State would be disproportionate or unfair so as to breach Convention rights.
The appellant could not argue that the value of his property was reduced so as to deprive him of a possession for the purposes of Article 1. He had constructed a house in multiple occupation and it was designated as such. He had therefore suffered no loss or deprivation.
Oliver Hyams (instructed by Robert Muckle, of Newcastle-upon-Tyne) appeared for the appellant; Kelvin Rutledge (instructed by the solicitor to Ealing London Borough Council) appeared for the respondents.
Vivienne Lane, barrister
