A ruling by the Court of Appeal that London premises comprising a ground floor shop with a self-contained first floor flat constitute a “house” for the purposes of enfranchisement law, will not be considered by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has refused permission to appeal in the case of Jewelcraft Ltd v Pressland [2015] EWCA Civ 1111; [2016] EGLR 10, on the basis that it does not raise an arguable point of law.
Last October, the court allowed an appeal against a Central London County Court ruling that the premises on Upper Richmond Road, SW15, did not qualify as a house within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Leasehold Reform Act 1967. Judge Dight had previously ruled that the claimant company, Jewelcraft, was not entitled to enfranchise.
Jeremy Hudson, a partner at Charles Russell Speechlys, expressed disappointment that the Supreme Court would not provide guidance on this area of the law, and that a decision will stand that he believes creates uncertainty and will lead to further litigation.
He said that the refusal of permission “leaves unresolved the issue of whether, in any given case, a mixed-use property qualifies for enfranchisement under the Leasehold Reform Act 1967”.
He added: “The premises in question comprised a ground-floor shop and flat above, with no internal connection between the two. It was decided that these did constitute a ‘house’ reasonably so-called. The facts were broadly similar to those in Henley v Cohen [2013] EWCA Civ 480, in which the Court of Appeal came to the opposite conclusion. The Court of Appeal in Jewelcraft doubted that Henley v Cohen had been correctly decided and it seems that the Supreme Court shared that view.
“The Court of Appeal in Jewelcraft asserted that the question of whether a particular property was a ‘house’ within the meaning of the Act was a question of law, not a purely factual issue for the judge, and that the policy of the Act dictates that there should be consistency of treatment.
“In those circumstances it is a pity that the Court of Appeal passed up the opportunity to provide general guidance as to how, as a matter of law and in the interests of consistency, all such cases ought to be approached.
“Following that decision and in the absence of such guidance it will be hard for landlords or tenants and their advisers to assess with any confidence whether a mixed-use property qualifies for enfranchisement. Those who looked to the Supreme Court to provide that guidance will be disappointed.”
