Mobile Homes Act 1983 – Protected residential site – Termination of licence – Court ordering termination of licence to occupy mobile home for breach of agreement – Whether respondent owner issuing adequate notice to appellant occupier to remedy breaches – Whether terminating agreement reasonable having regard to disability discrimination, equality law and human rights considerations – Appeal dismissed
The appellant owned and occupied a mobile home on a protected residential site owned by the respondent under a licence granted pursuant to the Mobile Homes Act 1983 in June 2006 (the agreement). On entering into the agreement, the appellant was supplied with a written statement under the 1983 Act containing the terms implied by the Act and additional express terms. The agreement incorporated paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the 1983 Act which entitled the respondent, as owner, to terminate the agreement forthwith if the court was satisfied on matters of breach, notice to remedy, non-compliance and reasonableness. It was an express term of the agreement that the appellant undertook to comply with the site rules and not to be a nuisance or cause annoyance, inconvenience or disturbance to the respondent or other occupiers.
In September 2009, the respondent issued proceedings seeking possession of the appellant’s plot alleging that he was in breach of the agreement by reason of his anti-social behaviour towards other residents amounting to a nuisance. The judge ordered that the appellant’s licence be terminated forthwith on the ground that he had acted in breach of his licence, had not complied with a notice dated 15 August 2006 to remedy the breaches and it was reasonable to terminate the licence.
The appellant appealed, contending that the judge had been wrong to hold that the letter of 15 August 2006 was a notice sufficient to satisfy paragraph 4. Moreover, it had not been reasonable to terminate the licence since the appellant suffered from a learning disability and the judge had failed to consider the relevant provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, the Equality Act 2010 and the Human Rights Act 1998.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
It was essential for the respondent to give a prior and proper notice to remedy a breach of the agreement. The 1983 Act expressly restricted its contractual right to terminate the agreement. The giving of an adequate notice to remedy breaches and the failure to comply with it were necessary to establish the jurisdiction of the court to determine that it was reasonable to terminate the agreement. The judge had been correct in law to hold that the letter of 15 August 2006 was a notice to remedy within the meaning of paragraph 4(a) since it described the conduct complained of, required the appellant to stop it, gave him an opportunity to do so and warned him of the consequences of not doing so.
The critical point was that the 1983 Act did not prescribe the form or detailed contents of the notice, or the information to be contained in it. Similarly, there were no express or implied prescriptive provisions in the 1983 Act placing limits on the duration of the period for which a notice might remain effective for the purpose of commencing legal proceedings. There was no indication in the 1983 Act that a new notice had to be served in respect of each fresh incident of anti-social behaviour. In this case, the initial notice of 15 August 2006 made it clear, by reference to the breaches he had committed in the past, what the appellant should not do in the future in order to comply with the terms of the agreement and to avoid the consequences of breaches.
The reference to “a reasonable time” created no practical problems for the appellant. He was simply being asked not to repeat the breaches complained of. If time was a problem, he could have asked for clarification or for more time, if that was appropriate. Nor was there any difficulty in the duration of the notice. Paragraph 4 did not set any end-date for the expiration of a notice. There was no reason why the notice served in this case should not have continuing effect for the whole period of the appellant’s occupation. All that the notice was seeking to achieve was future compliance with continuing obligations in circumstances where breaches had already occurred.
Further, in order to suffice for purposes of the 1983 Act, a notice did not have to set out in specific detail the particulars of the breach by reference to a rule or term of the agreement, reference generally to bad behaviour or nuisance being sufficient; nor did it have to be in any prescribed form or state that failure to remedy a breach might result in termination of the agreement; nor did the breaches and requests to remedy all have to be contained within one letter or notice. It was not for the court to prescribe detailed requirements where Parliament could have done so, but had decided not to. The court’s function was to decide, on the particular facts of each case, whether the requirements of paragraph 4(a) were satisfied. In doing so, it would adopt the normal course of interpreting any document relied on as a notice as a reasonable reader, with knowledge of all the objective surrounding circumstances, would understand it.
The power of the court under paragraph 4 was very wide. The judge was under a duty to consider all the circumstances relevant to the issue of reasonableness, including the appellant’s disability, even though no unlawful disability discrimination was alleged or established. In the present case, there were no good grounds for contending that the judge took the wrong approach to the issue whether it was reasonable to terminate the agreement or that he left out of account factors arising from the 1995 Act, the 2010 Act or the 1998 Act that might be relevant to the issue of reasonableness.
The judge had been aware of the serious consequences of the order and of the cumulative effect that his decision would have for the appellant in the loss of his home at the site and possible loss of a valuable asset with severe financial consequences. But, in deciding whether it was reasonable to terminate the agreement, the court also had to take account of the rights of other residents as regards respect for their homes and their private life and the right to their possessions and the rights of the respondent to its possessions.
Lindsay Johnson (instructed by Fisher Jones Greenwood LLP) appeared for the appellant; Stephen Goodfellow (instructed by Asher Prior Bates) appeared for the respondent.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
