Extension to London Underground — Compensation for damage caused by works — Whether works amounting to “street works” — Applicable statutory regime — New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 — Appeal dismissed
Works carried out by the respondent in extending the London underground Jubilee Line damaged a sewer for which the appellant was responsible. A dispute arose as to which statutory regime governed the assessment of compensation. The appellant relied upon the London Underground Act 1992 and the London Underground Jubilee Act 1993, which authorised the respondent to carry out the works; both Acts incorporated section 13 of the London Transport Act 1976. The respondent, on the other hand, relied upon the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 and the Street Works (Sharing of Costs of Works) Regulations 1992 made thereunder, on the basis that the works constituted “major highway works” or “major transport works”, as defined in Part III of the 1991 Act.
The crucial provision was section 101(1) of the 1991 Act, which had come into force in January 1993, after the 1992 Act but before the 1993 Act. Section 101(1) provided that any special enactment passed prior to Part III that regulated the execution of “street works” in a manner inconsistent with that Part should cease to have effect. A second limb provided that special enactments passed after Part III were not to be construed as making any inconsistent provision, unless a contrary intention appeared. The 1976, 1992 and 1993 Acts were all “special enactments” for the purpose of section 101.
Trying a preliminary issue, the judge held that the applicable regime was that of the 1991 Act. The appellant appealed.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
It was clear from the structure, language and purpose of Part III that “major highway works” and “major transport works” were categories of “street works”, and therefore fell within the ambit of section 101. Consequently, the works carried out by the respondent were “street works”.
So far as “street works” were concerned, section 101 ensured that the 1991 Act and the regulations made under it provided a comprehensive code. The material parts of the 1992 Act had ceased to have effect when section 101 came into force, and the 1993 Act was to be construed in the same way. The express incorporation of section 13 of the 1976 Act into the 1993 Act, after section 101 had come into force, did not manifest a “contrary intention” within the meaning of the second limb. The incorporation of section 13 was expressly stated, in section 22(1) of the 1993 Act, to be “with necessary modifications”. The proper application of section 101, in that context, was that in relation to street works, but not in other respects; the incorporation of section 13 of the 1976 Act was modified, and the 1993 Act was to be construed so as to avoid inconsistency with Part III of the 1991 Act.
Lord Kingsland QC and Douglas Edwards (instructed by the solicitor to Thames Water Utilities Ltd) appeared for the appellant; Joseph Harper QC (instructed by the solicitor to London Underground Ltd) appeared for the respondent.
Sally Dobson, barrister
