Park homes – Protected site – Houseboat – Respondent mooring houseboat at marina owned by appellant – First-tier Tribunal deciding area on which houseboat floated was “protected site” to which Mobile Homes Act 1983 applied – Appellant appealing – Whether respondent occupying “caravan” – Whether site being part of protected site – Whether planning permission for use of respondent’s pitch as caravan site – Appeal dismissed
The appellant was the freehold owner of the Hartford Marina, Wyton, Huntingdon where the respondent’s houseboat, at 8 West Pontoon, was moored on the lake at the marina which had been created by a flooded gravel pit, with about 200 mixed residential and leisure berths. A houseboat was not a technical term but referred to a structure comprising a caravan placed on a specially designed float, which was moored to the appellant’s pontoon on the lake at the marina. The pontoons belonged to the appellant and the houseboats were moored pursuant to licence agreements with their owners, who paid a fee to the appellant.
The marina benefitted from planning permission granted in 1998 by the local planning authority for: “Retention of use of land for 15 houseboats for holiday use, moorings, parking and ancillary development … ”.
The first condition to the 1998 planning permission read: “The houseboats hereby approved shall be used only as holiday accommodation and shall not be used as the sole or main residence of any person” (the first condition).
The respondent argued that she lived in a caravan as defined in the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960, and that the area on which her houseboat floated was a “protected site” as defined in that Act, to which the Mobile Homes Act 1983 applied.
Section 29 of the 1960 Act provided: ““caravan” means any structure designed or adapted for human habitation which is capable of being moved from one place to another ….” (a statutory caravan).
The First-tier Tribunal (FTT) decided that the 1983 Act did apply so that the respondent had some security in the face of threatened possession proceedings. The appellant appealed.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
(1) Section 1 of the 1983 Act was about an agreement under which the occupier was entitled to station a mobile home on land forming part of a protected site. In this case, the respondent’s property taken as a whole was a houseboat, comprising a caravan on a float. Taken as a whole, her property was not a caravan because it failed the mobility test. However, it was agreed between the parties that the caravan that formed part of the houseboat was by itself a statutory caravan.
As a matter of fact, the respondent lived in a structure which was a caravan as defined by section 29 of the 1960 Act. Further, the respondent’s agreement with the appellant entitled her to station her statutory caravan on land which included land covered by water: Howard v Charlton [2002] EWCA Civ 1086; [2002] 3 EGLR 65 considered.
(2) The meaning of a protected site in section 1(2) of the Caravan Sites Act 1968 involved the site being one in respect of which planning permission had been granted for the stationing of one or more caravans. If planning permission had not been granted, then the site was not a protected site within the meaning of that Act or, thus, within the meaning of the 1983 Act: Balthasar v Mullane [1985] 2 EGLR 260 applied.
The practical effect of the 1998 planning permission was that there was permission for caravans, forming part of houseboats, to be on the land. Therefore, the area to which the 1998 planning permission applied was a caravan site as defined by section 1(4) of the 1960 Act. In granting permission for houseboats, the local planning authority gave permission for both of the two components of those houseboats to be on the land. As a matter of fact, the respondent was living in a statutory caravan which was stationed on land in accordance with the 1998 planning permission. The pitch was therefore a caravan site, being land on which a caravan was stationed for the purposes of human habitation, and it had planning permission.
The 1998 permission was a planning permission for a limited form of caravan site for the stationing of houseboats on land covered by water, not a permission for the stationing of caravans on dry land; the permission incorporated a functional limitation.
(3) The 1998 planning permission was clearly expressed to be granted for holiday use only, both by virtue of the description of what was permitted which incorporated a functional limitation and by virtue of the first condition. However, the respondent relied upon a certificate of lawfulness of existing use or development granted in 2014 pursuant to section 191 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990
That certificate said that the use described in the first schedule was lawful, and described that use as “use (as existing) for occupation as a sole residence”. Since it was clear that a planning permission for holiday use was not a permission for residential use, it made no sense to say that the permitted use set out in the 1998 planning permission remained in effect so far as the respondent’s pitch was concerned.
The fact that the first condition to the 1998 planning permission was by 2014 unenforceable was a good reason both to authorise the breach of condition and to certify that the use of the property was lawful, rendering obsolete the limitation to holiday use in the 1998 planning permission as well as the first condition to that permission. Therefore, the certificate was given under section 191(1)(a) and changed the permitted use of the respondent’s pitch, rather than merely declaring a condition to be unenforceable.
(4) The certificate was therefore a certificate under section 191 “in respect of the use” of the land, and it had effect as if it were a grant of planning permission for the purposes of section 3(3) of the 1960 Act. It was the “relevant planning permission” under section 1(2) of the 1968 Act, because following the grant of the certificate the 1998 planning permission no longer defined the permitted use of the respondent’s pitch. It was not expressed to be for holiday use only, nor subject to the sort of condition described in section 1(2)(b), and therefore the site was a protected site.
Accordingly, the Mobile Homes Act 1983 applied to the agreement under which the respondent occupied her pitch on her houseboat.
Michael Rudd (instructed by Ryan & Frost, of Wellingborough) appeared for the appellant; Stephen Cottle (instructed by Deighton Pierce Glynn) appeared for the respondent.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
Click here to read a transcript of Tingdene Marinas Ltd v Jaffe
