Road traffic – Traffic regulation order (TRO) – Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 – Defendant local authority making TRO prohibiting use of road – Claimant objecting to making of order – Whether defendants failing to consider statutory duties – Whether defendants acting irrationally – Application dismissed
The claimant was a private company limited by guarantee. It was a national organisation, the objects of which were to preserve the full status of vehicular green lanes and the rights of motorcyclists and others to use them as a legitimate part of the access network of the countryside.
The R7124 road was situated in the parish of Burrington in Devon and had not been used for many years. On 8 August 2012, the defendant local authority, as the road traffic authority, made a traffic regulation order (TRO) pursuant to their powers under section 1(1) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1994 prohibiting motor vehicles from using the road. The statement of reasons included the promotion of road safety following concerns raised over the poor alignment and visibility at the junction of the road with the A377 trunk road running between Exeter and Barnstable.
Section (1)(a) of the 1984 Act empowered the defendants to make a TRO “…where it appears to the authority making the order that it is expedient to make it (a) for avoiding danger to persons or other traffic using the road or any other road or for preventing the likelihood of any such danger arising….”.
The claimant challenged the validity of the order under paragraph 35 of Schedule 9 to the 1984 Act. It argued that the defendants had: (i) failed to direct themselves that they could only make a TRO if they considered it expedient to do so for one of the statutory purposes in section 1 of the 1984 Act and so had failed to satisfy themselves that it was so expedient; (ii) failed to consider properly their duties under section 122(2) of the 1984 Act, section 130 of the Highways Act 1980 Act; and section 16 of the Traffic Management Act 1984; and (iii) acted irrationally in deciding to make the order in that there was insufficient evidence either of danger to the public or that the order would protect the public.
Held: The application was dismissed.
(1) The defendants were under a duty to provide adequate reasons for their decision to make the order. However, the particularity of the reasons required of a decision-making body would depend on a number of factors, including the degree of complexity of the issues involved. In the present case it was relevant that the claimant had been involved in the decision-making process from a relatively early stage. The claimant had advocated its objections both in writing and orally, bringing to the notice of the defendants relevant matters of law and fact. Thus the reasons ultimately provided by the defendants for their decision fell to be considered in that context and against that background, including the defendants’ notice of their proposal to make the TRO. The claimant itself was a body familiar with the issues raised and with the principles raised in other similar cases. Moreover, the issues, while exciting controversy, were not in themselves particularly complex: South Bucks District Council and Another v Porter [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 4 PLR 50 applied.
(2) The central issue was the safety of road users, both on the road itself and those using the A377. That had been the principal reason given by the defendants in their notice of proposal to make the order. It was equally evident that pursuant to section 1(1)(a) of the 1984 Act, the defendants were empowered to make a TRO. The fact that they had made no express reference to section 1 of the 1984 Act did not mean that they had failed to direct themselves under its provisions. The subcommittee which made the decision was a specialist one dedicated to the consideration of TROs and the reason provided for the decision was clearly within the ambit of section 1(1)(a). Moreover, the fact that the defendants had made no express reference to section 122 of the 1984 Act, or any other statutory provisions mentioned by the claimant, did not give rise to the claim that the defendants had failed to consider that section and/or to discharge their statutory duty. The fact that the defendants had had regard to and discharged their statutory duty under section 122(1), and taken into account matters referred to in section 122(2), was apparent from the original reasons provided by the defendants for their proposal to make the order: UK Waste Management v West Lancashire District Council [1996] RTR 201, R (on the application of LPC Group Plc) v Leicestershire City Council [2002] EWHC 2485 (Admin) and Wilson and Another v Yorkshire Dales National Park Authority [2009] EWHC 1425 (Admin) considered.
(3) As regards the question of irrationality, there was no evidence of any misdirection of law. In relation to evidential matters, which they did and should have taken into account, the defendants, relying on section 1(1)(a) of the 1984 Act, had to consider the evidence relating to the safety of the junction of the road with the A377. Although a formal safety audit had not apparently been carried out, that was not a statutory requirement. In any event, there had been sufficient evidence for the defendants to conclude that it was expedient to make a TRO in accordance with their powers under section 1(1)(a). In doing so, the defendants had fulfilled their duty under section 122(1), after having regard to the matters specified in section 122(2). The defendants had been entitled to conclude that there were alternative routes available to gain access to the A377. On the evidence, the decision to make a TRO could not be impugned on the ground of irrationality as there was no evidence that extraneous matters had been taken into account: Samuel Smith Old Brewery (Tadcaster) v North Yorkshire County Council (CA, Pill, Thorpe and Buxton LJJ) (unreported, 14 December 2000) considered.
Thomas Fletcher (instructed by Brian Chase Coles Solicitors) appeared for the claimant; Stephen Whale (instructed by Devon County Council Legal Department) appeared for the defendants.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
