Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 — Succession — Appeal by landlords by case stated from decision of Agricultural Land Tribunal in favour of applicant for declaration entitling him to new tenancy — The applicant, following the death of his father, had applied to the tribunal under both section 20 and section 21 of the Act — The landlords, trustees of a family trust, applied for consent to a notice to quit which they had served on the death of the applicant’s father, the trustees’ application being under section 22 of the Act — The tribunal had decided in favour of the applicant under section 20, but, in case they were wrong, decided that he should be ‘treated as eligible’ under section 21 — They also refused consent to the landlords’ notice to quit on the latter’s application under section 22 — On the present appeal by the landlords, the Court of Appeal held that the tribunal were clearly wrong in concluding that the applicant had met the conditions of eligibility under section 20 — He did not satisfy the ‘principal livelihood’ condition of section 18(2) — The criticisms of the tribunal’s decision to treat the applicant as eligible under section 21 were not, however, justified — In particular, a criticism that the tribunal did not correctly apply the ‘fair and reasonable’ test in section 21(3)(b) was rejected — The real question to be considered was whether it was fair and reasonable for the applicant to be able to apply for a direction under section 20 notwithstanding that he was technically ineligible — The tribunal’s determination under this head could not be faulted — As regards the landlords’ application for consent to the notice to quit, they had to show that greater hardship would be caused by
This was a
case stated by the Agricultural Land Tribunal for the Northern Area by which
the appellants, trustees of the estate of James Raine (Senior), the landlords
of Rigg End Farm, Newbiggin on Lune, Ravenstonedale, nr Kirkby Stephen,
Cumbria, challenged decisions of the tribunal in favour of the applicant, James
Brian Raine, the tenant of the farm, in respect of applications by him under
sections 20 and 21 of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 and
in respect of an application by the appellant landlords for consent to a notice
to quit the holding.
A R D Stuttard
(instructed by Kershaws, of Penrith, Cumbria) appeared on behalf of the
appellants; P St J H Langan QC (instructed by Fell, Kilvington & Co, of
Kirkby Stephen, Cumbria) represented the respondent.
Giving
judgment, FORBES J said: This is a case stated by the Agricultural Land
Tribunal — Northern Area, in respect of their adjudication upon three
applications submitted to them, sitting at Appleby Magistrates’ Court on
November 8 1983.
The respondent
(that is the applicant in the hearing before the tribunal) is a man called
James Brian Raine. His grandfather was James Raine (Senior), who died in 1945.
He left his estate including Rigg End Farm in trust for certain beneficiaries,
largely (as I understand it) his family. I have not been shown the trust and I
do not think that it matters. When he died, his son, James Raine (Junior), the
father of this respondent, took over the tenancy of the farm. Of course, the
landlords of the farm were the trustees of James Raine (Senior)’s estate. James
Raine (Junior) died on January 22 1982.
The two
applications which were before the tribunal by his son, Brian Raine, were:
firstly, an application under section 20(1) of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1976 for a declaration that Brian was entitled to succeed to
the tenancy of the holding; secondly, an alternative application to be treated
as eligible under section 21(2) of the Act if the application under section 20
were unsuccessful. Then there was an application, not by the respondent but by
the landlords (that is the present appellants), for consent to the operation of
a notice to quit as a result of the death of James Raine (Junior) under section
3(3)(d) of the Agricultural Holdings (Notices to Quit) Act 1977, on the basis
that greater hardship would be caused by withholding rather than giving consent
to the operation of the notice.
Section 20 of
the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 reads in this way:
(1) Any eligible person may within the relevant
period apply to the Tribunal for a direction entitling him to a tenancy of the
holding. (2) Where only one application is made under this section the
Tribunal, if satisfied that the applicant is an eligible person, shall
determine whether he is in their opinion a suitable person to become the tenant
of the holding.
I may say at
once that there is, as I understand it, no argument as to suitability. The
question is whether this respondent satisfies the test of eligibility mentioned
in section 20(1).
In order to
discover what eligibility is, one must look back to section 18(1):
Where after
the passing of this Act the sole (or sole surviving) tenant of an agricultural
holding dies and is survived by any of the following persons: . . . (c) a child
of the deceased; . . . the following sections of this Part of this Act . . .
shall apply unless excluded by subsection (4) below.
That does not
apply.
There is no
suggestion so far that he is not eligible. This respondent is in fact a child
of the deceased and falls therefore within the ambit of section 18(1). That,
however, is not conclusive about whether or not he is an ‘eligible person’. In
order to discover that, one has to look at section 18(2), which is the
definition subsection:
. . .
‘eligible person’ means (subject to subsection (3) below and without prejudice
to section 21 of this Act)
we need not
concern ourselves with subsection (3)
a survivor of
the deceased in whose case the following conditions are satisfied (a) he falls
within paragraphs (a) to (d) of subsection (1) above
that is
accepted
(b) in the
seven years ending with the date of death his only or principal source of
livelihood throughout a continuous period of not less than five years, or two
or more discontinuous periods together amounting to not less than five years,
derived from his agricultural work on the holding or on an agricultural unit of
which the holding forms part . . .
The remainder
of the subsection is immaterial.
If you are an
‘eligible person’ (that is, if you fulfil the requirements which I have just
read out from section 18(2)) you make an application to the tribunal, and if
the tribunal determine you are a suitable person to become the tenant of that
holding, as I understand it, the tribunal may so declare. If, however, you do
not fall within the provisions of section 18(2), you may still succeed in
getting the tribunal to treat you as an ‘eligible person’ if you fall within
section 21.
Section 21(1)
provides:
This section
applies to any survivor of the deceased who for some part of the seven years
ending with the date of death engaged . . . in agricultural work on the
holding, being a person in whose case (a) the conditions specified in
paragraphs (a) and (c) of the definition of ‘eligible person’ in section 18(2)
of this Act are satisfied; and (b) the condition specified in paragraph (b) of
that definition, though not fully satisfied, is satisfied to a material extent.
Subsection (2)
provides for a person to apply to a tribunal ‘to be treated as an eligible
person’. That of course was the second application which this respondent made.
Subsection (3)
provides:
If on an
application under this section (a) the Tribunal are satisfied that the
applicant is a person to whom this section applies; and (b) it appears to the
Tribunal that in all the circumstances it would be fair and reasonable for the
applicant to be able to apply under section 20 of this Act for a direction
entitling him to a tenancy of the holding, the Tribunal shall determine that he
is to be treated as an eligible person for the purposes of this Part of this Act,
but shall otherwise dismiss the application.
There then
follow some consequential matters. Subsection (6) provides:
Without
prejudice to the generality of subsection (1)(b) above, cases where the
condition mentioned in subsection (1)(b) above might be less than fully
satisfied include cases where the survivor’s agricultural work on the holding
fell short of providing him with his principal source of livelihood because the
holding was too small.
In the event,
this tribunal determined: firstly, that the applicant was an ‘eligible person’
under section 20; secondly, that if they were wrong in that, he should be
treated as an ‘eligible person’ under section 21; and, thirdly, that the notice
to quit should not be confirmed (if that is the right expression to use)
because the landlords had failed to satisfy them that greater hardship would be
caused by withholding consent rather than by giving it. That, as I understand
it, the present appellants failed to do before the tribunal.
I must start,
I think, by emphasising (because it seemed to me that in portions of this case
it was in danger of being forgotten) that this court is not in these matters a
court of appeal. It is a court with a review jurisdiction. This court will not,
and cannot, act unless it is shown that the tribunal in some way misconducted
themselves, in the sense that they misdirected themselves on law, took into
account matters they should not have taken into account and so on, or of course
that their decision is such that no reasonable tribunal, properly directing
themselves could have arrived at. When it comes to questions like the weight to
be attached to this or that matter or whether evidence should be accepted or
rejected and all the rest of those things, those are matters purely within the tribunal
and are not matters on which this court has any sort of appellate jurisdiction.
Of course, if the tribunal come to a conclusion on the basis of no evidence at
all, this court quite clearly will interfere. But the court is not concerned
with merits or weight or anything of that kind. It is solely concerned as a
review tribunal.
The second
general thing I want to say is that the case stated in this matter is
hopelessly and completely at fault. It is not in the proper form. It does not
set out the proper matters and does not ask the proper questions. I can only
plead that if agricultural land tribunals are going to state cases for the
court they should state them in proper form. There is no difficulty about it.
They are stated every day of the
properly, concisely and succinctly. If they are stated in that way, the court
knows what it has to deal with instead of trying to disentangle the issues from
pages and pages of what may or may not be relevant documents.
However, with
the assistance of Mr Stuttard, we have, I think, discerned the points. First of
all, it is said that the tribunal were wrong in coming to the conclusion that
the respondent was covered by section 20 of the Act. That is clearly a right
and proper submission. They were wrong. Mr Langan, for the respondent, accepts
that they were wrong. They were wrong because quite clearly on the facts (which
I shall turn to in a moment) this young man had not brought himself within
section 18(2). He could not show — and manifestly could not show — on the
evidence that he had been working for a continuous period of not less than five
years and so on and had derived from his agricultural work on the holding the
principal source of his livelihood.
The facts are
quite clear and I have had my attention drawn to the relevant material. The
five years in total are the five years from 1978 to 1982. His history, as far
as the farm is concerned, is this and it is a history which was accepted by the
tribunal. What he said was that he was born in 1951 and left school in about
1967. He had worked full-time on the farm, as I understand it, until 1974. He
then left in this sense: because his father could not afford to pay him a
living wage, he did part-time work at the farm, largely mornings and evenings;
the rest of the time he worked in some other capacity. He worked on the farm,
but he also worked as a lorry driver and so on. It is clear from his evidence,
as recorded by the tribunal, that at any rate up to November 1977 (from 1974 to
November 1977) he was working only part of his time on the farm and making up
his earnings elsewhere. He married in 1979. He has one child, who is a Down’s
Syndrome baby.
I do not think
I need go through the figures. It is quite apparent that certainly for 1978 and
1979 he derived more from his work outside the farm — Rigg End Farm — than he
did from working for his father. For the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 he earned
more from his work for his father than he did from outside sources. But in any
event it could not possibly be said that he had derived the principal source of
his livelihood from working on Rigg End Farm for the previous five years. Quite
clearly, therefore, he did not qualify to be an ‘eligible person’ under section
20:
However, the
tribunal had in front of them also an application to treat him as eligible
under section 21 and proceeded to consider that application. In para 25 they
turned to that and said that if they should be held to be wrong on section 20:
the tribunal
found again as a unanimous decision that the applicant was to be treated as
eligible under section 21(2) of the Act, and that it was fair and reasonable
that he should be so treated in that if his livelihood were held to fall short
of being the principal part of his livelihood, then it did in each year fulfil
it to a material extent bearing in mind the interpretation of ‘material extent’
laid down by this Tribunal in another case that that ‘material extent’ should
be construed as being ‘substantial in terms of time and important in terms of
money’. This interpretation of ‘material extent’ had received the approval of
the High Court and the Court of Appeal in numerous other cases.
I confess I
find it almost impossible to follow Mr Stuttard’s argument on this point. It
seemed to me to start with the proposition that because they had been wrong on
section 20, they had never applied their minds to section 21. That seems to me
to be plainly wrong. It is absolutely clear from the paragraph I have just read
that the tribunal did turn their mind to section 21.
Of course they
were wrong about section 20. But taking into account all the material they had,
they then proceeded to look at the situation under section 21. The point about
section 21 is that you do not start to qualify for consideration under that
section unless you have failed to qualify under section 20. Section 21(1) puts
it fairly and squarely: ‘This section applies to any survivor of the deceased
who for some part of the seven years ending with the date of death engaged . .
. in agricultural work on the holding . . .’. In other words, if you do not
qualify under section 20 because you have not done a continuous period of five
years, you may yet qualify at least for consideration if, not satisfying that,
you nevertheless satisfy the test that you had been engaged in agricultural
work on that holding ‘for some part of the seven years’.
There is
absolutely no doubt, it seems to me, that this young man qualified on the
evidence which the tribunal accepted. He had clearly been engaged in
agricultural work on the holding ‘for some part of the seven years’. We then
look at the rest of that subsection:
. . . being a
person in whose case (a) the conditions specified in paragraphs (a) and (c) of
the definition of ‘eligible person’ in section 18(2) of this Act are satisfied
there is no
argument but that that applies. We have only to look at (b)
and (b) the
condition specified in paragraph (b) of that definition, though not fully
satisfied, is satisfied to a material extent.
What is that
condition? Within the seven years you
have got to have been working. Note there are two points: one is time and the
other is money. Under section 18(2) you have to show you have been working
throughout a continuous period of not less than five years. You have also to
show that you derive from your agricultural work on that holding your principal
source of livelihood. You may fail to satisfy section 18(2)(b) on one or both
of those two grounds. One is the time for which you have been working and the
other is the extent of the livelihood (if any) which you have been deriving
from that work.
The tribunal,
to my mind, correctly directed themselves to that point: the point being that
you can be considered as falling within section 21 if — despite the fact that
you fail on either time or money or both — the condition is satisfied to a
material extent. The tribunal say: ‘What is a material extent?’ and direct themselves that it means ‘substantial
in terms of time and important in terms of money’.
As I
understand it, Mr Stuttard does not suggest for a moment that, in doing that,
they misdirected themselves. What he said was that they could not find that the
respondent was an ‘eligible person’ or should be treated as ‘eligible’ under section
21 because he clearly did not fulfil the requirements of section 18(2). The
answer to that is, of course, he did not, otherwise he would not be being
considered under section 21. It is because I fail to understand that sort of
argument that I have indicated I really find myself in a disadvantageous
position. I could not understand what — if any — complaint could be made
against the way in which the tribunal attacked this matter. I do not think a
complaint can be made. They quite clearly considered the appropriate matters
under section 21. They quite clearly directed themselves properly on what was a
‘material extent’.
The point
which I think I ought to deal with — because it is at least intelligible — is
this. It was suggested by Mr Stuttard that they misdirected themselves in the
paragraph which I have just read in that, in deciding whether it was fair and
reasonable, they failed to take into account the effect on the other
beneficiaries. There are two answers to that. The first is that it was never
suggested by the respondent (as far as I can see) to the tribunal when they
were considering this matter that there was anything in this point which should
affect their decision.
What had
happened was that questions of hardship had, of course, been canvassed in
considering the application on the notice to quit, the third of the
applications made by the landlords. The tribunal had gone at some length into
what was hardship in respect of the respondent and in respect of the other
beneficiaries. But they were never asked to consider those matters as impinging
on their decision as to whether it would be fair and reasonable under section
21(3).
I think,
myself, that a tribunal like this one, where the parties are both represented
by experienced counsel, are entitled to expect that every matter of substance
which counsel wishes them to consider as impinging on their decision is put
before them. If no such matter is put before them, it does not seem to me that
it really lies in the mouth of counsel to come to this court and say the lower
tribunal erred in not considering this matter in their decision. It smells of
the lamp, and it is not a matter which, to my mind, should be encouraged. If
there was anything in this point, it should have been brought to the attention
of the tribunal before their decision was made and not now, for the first time,
raised as a matter suggesting that the tribunal’s decision should be upset.
The second
point is that I am not satisfied that it would be right for them to consider
these matters when they were looking at the question of whether it was fair and
reasonable. I do not say that they could not do so. Perhaps I phrased it
wrongly in saying ‘it would be right’. It would not be wrong, in my view, not
to take these matters into consideration when considering whether it was fair
and reasonable. What they have to consider, when looking at the question of
whether it was fair and reasonable, is whether it would be fair and reasonable
for the applicant to be able to apply under section 20 of this Act for a
direction. That seems to me to put a different complexion on the matter.
What the Act
is asking the tribunal to look at is whether it is right that the position in
which the applicant technically is (ie not
such a way that would enable him to be treated as if he were ‘eligible’. It is
not that he should be granted whatever follows as a result of being eligible,
but that it would not be fair and reasonable, in other words, to exclude him
from the status of eligibility having regard, presumably, inter alia to
the material extent to which the conditions specified in para (b) have been
satisfied.
That is really
what this part of the Act is concerned with. It is concerned, in other words,
not so much with the merits themselves as with the question of overcoming a
procedural bar (if I can call it that). That is why the tribunal have to
consider what is fair and reasonable in this situation. They have to consider
it against the background that it has to be fair and reasonable for the
applicant to be able to apply to be treated as eligible; in other words, to be
able to apply for a direction entitling him to the tenancy under section 20.
When one looks
at it in that way, I am not at all sure that the question of the effect on the
other beneficiaries is necessarily a matter which they must take into account.
As I say, I do not think they could be faulted if they did take it into account
if it was relevant. Equally, I do not think they could be faulted if they did
not take it into account if it was irrelevant. Be that as it may, they were
never asked to take it into account. For all those reasons, it seems to me that
that matter is not one which should lead to their decision on this point being
quashed.
That being so
and the tribunal having made a direction that the applicant should be entitled
to a tenancy of the holding, I am not at all sure how far — nobody has argued
this point — the question of the validity of the operation of the notice to
quit under the 1977 Act is still a live issue. I suppose I should deal with
that in any event. That is a matter which arises under the Agricultural
Holdings (Notices to Quit) Act 1977 section 3(1), which is in these terms:
Subject to
subsection (2) below, the Tribunal shall consent under section 2 above to the
operation of a notice to quit an agricultural holding or part of an
agricultural holding if, but only if, they are satisfied as to one or more of
the matters mentioned in subsection (3) below, being a matter or matters
specified by the landlord in his application for their consent.
Subsection (3)
provides: ‘The matters referred to in subsection (1) above are . . . (d) that
greater hardship would be caused by withholding than by giving consent to the
operation of the notice . . . .’ In
other words, looked at in a straightforward way, what the landlords have to
show is that greater hardship would be caused to them by withholding the
consent to the operation of the notice than would be caused to the tenant by
granting it.
That is a
matter which the tribunal looked at in para 28 of their decision. It is a
longish paragraph, but in view of the matters which have been raised, I am
prepared to read it:
The tribunal
then turned to the notice to quit which hinged entirely on the question of
greater hardship between the applicant and the beneficiaries under the
grandfather’s estate. Tribunals always find the question of greater hardship
matters of great difficulty to decide. The mere fact that hardship is pleaded
on both sides shows that someone is going to suffer. In this particular case
the major claim of hardship on the respondent landlords’ side hinged on the
case of Miss Jean Raine, who was at present working and had a job and although
her health provided some reason for concern it was not at present ‘pressing and
immediate’ so far as she was concerned. Each of the other beneficiaries was in
reasonable circumstances, and the tribunal felt that on the balance of hardship
if they were to give consent to the notice to quit the greater hardship would
fall on the applicant. In coming to this conclusion they took into account not
only the trustees of the estate but the effect on all the beneficiaries so far
as evidence had been laid before the tribunal and weighed this against the
position which would face the applicant and his family if he were refused the
application and had to give possession of the farm. Although he would have a
considerable amount of money from the realisation of his stock and assets, he
would be without a job and the Tribunal accepted his evidence that he was
primarily a farmer and wishing to continue in his farming activities. This had
become abundantly clear to them after they heard the evidence. It may have been
that when he was younger and had just left school the applicant was looking for
wider pastures but the evidence he gave the tribunal both by himself and his
wife was that his whole heart was in farming and to be in farming on the
holding which had been occupied by his father for so many years. If he lost his
job he would have the utmost difficulty in finding any other work in farming
and certainly on his own account, as his finance would not enable him to buy
another holding and stock it. His wife and his invalid son would be left
without any basic support other than their capital, and the effect on the
family would obviously be catastrophic. The tribunal held, after weighing all
the evidence, that in their view the balance of hardship would be very much
greater to the applicant if consent were to be given to the operation of the
notice to quit than to the beneficiaries if it were refused. They therefore
refused to give their consent to the operation of the notice to quit. This
again was a unanimous decision.
The challenge
to that is on two grounds. It is said, first of all, that the tribunal failed
to take into account the income position: that is, the fact that the respondent
in this case was possessed, or would be possessed, of capital which he could
invest in order to bring in money. To my mind, that is just not right. It is
quite clear that the tribunal did take that into account. I will only read
again a small passage from para 28:
Although he
that is the
respondent
would have a
considerable amount of money from the realisation of his stock and assets, he
would be without a job and the tribunal accepted his evidence that he was
primarily a farmer and wishing to continue in his farming activities.
Of course they
have not specifically said that he could invest the money to bring in an
income, but as I suggested to Mr Stuttard in the course of his argument, I
decline to believe that the tribunal took the view that he was ‘going to stick
it under the mattress’. Quite clearly they had in mind that he could invest
that money. Indeed, when one looks at another passage lower down in para 28, it
becomes even clearer: ‘His wife and his invalid son would be left without any
basic support other than their capital . . . .’
I do not imagine again that the tribunal were thinking they were going
to have to nibble away at their capital.
Quite clearly
there was in the minds of the tribunal the fact that that capital represented
(notionally at any rate) an income which would accrue to the benefit of the
respondent and his family. They weighed that, as they clearly weighed all the
other considerations, and came to the conclusion that they were not satisfied
that greater hardship would be caused by withholding consent than granting it.
Indeed, they put it the other way. They found positively that greater hardship
would be caused by granting the operation of the notice to quit.
The second
point which was taken arises in this way. It is said that the applicant would
be better off if he lost the farm and lived on the income of his capital than
he would be if he went on working on the farm because the capital would be
largely employed in the farm. The position then would be that his income would
be less from his farming activities than it would be if he invested the money.
Quite apart from the fact that that seems to me to be a remark which could be
addressed to virtually every single farmer in the country (because it is
notorious that returns on capital from the farming industry are infinitely
lower than from anywhere else), it seems to me that that is a matter which the
tribunal did take into account. They quite clearly took into account the fact
that he would have capital which would represent income. They also took into
account the fact that if the notice to quit operated, he would be left without
a job (and without a job in farming) and that farming was his life.
You have only
to consider the reasons why people farm. The reason — generally speaking at any
rate — is not because they make a huge profit out of it, but because it is a
way of life. The fact is that a very large number of (if not most) farmers, as
I have already indicated, make much less out of the farm in which they are
employing their capital than they would if they put their capital into whatever
is the fashionable way of investing money at any particular period.
I do not think
there is anything in that point. It may be that they have not specifically
said, ‘We have considered whether he would be financially better off by not
farming the holding’, but they have taken a broad view that by not farming the
holding, he would be unable to carry out what was his dearest wish, namely, to
go on farming.
The last
matter which is suggested is that the tribunal did not take into account that
the applicant was possessed of greater capital than all the beneficiaries of
the land or estate put together. It may well be that they did not mention that
point. They certainly had the material in front of them. I do not think that it
is a point of any substance at all. Indeed, it could be argued, it seems to me,
that on the facts as I have seen them it is not a matter that should be taken
into account.
The situation,
as the tribunal pointed out, was that each of the other beneficiaries — that is
apart from Miss Jean Raine — was in reasonable circumstances. It is clear,
looking at it, that some of them had capital; whether disposable or not is
clear in some cases but not in others. For instance, one of the beneficiaries
is said to have owned his cottage and had £7,000 and so on. I do not need to
read it. It is all set out in the evidence. When one looks at that, one of
them, Mrs Dent, had some savings of £2,000 plus her share in the Raine estate.
She was married to a working farmer who made a profit out of his farm. Mr
William Hunter was retired. He had £7,000 plus a pension from the water
authority. In addition, he received weekly sick benefit of £61. Mr Dennis Raine
was employed at a salary of £6,000 a year and lived in a house owned by his
mother-in-law for which he paid no rent.
Whether or not
in those circumstances it would be right to say that because the applicant had
greater capital than some of the others was a matter to be taken into account
in a decision of greater hardship, I do not really know. It does not appear to
me that the case is made out. In any event, I question whether in fact the
possession of capital could be said without more — I emphasise that — to be at
all relevant to the question of greater hardship. Of course it may be that lack
of capital is a matter which does indicate hardship if it is coupled with
something else.
If one is
homeless and has no capital to buy a house, and there is no possibility of
renting one, then it may be that the lack of capital is an indication in those
circumstances of hardship. But that would be because of those circumstances
which were allied to the lack of capital. The mere lack of capital itself could
hardly be said to indicate greater hardship or even hardship. Mr Dennis Raine,
for instance, seems to be very comfortably off on a salary of £6,000 a year
living in a rent-free house owned by his mother-in-law. One wonders what
hardship is caused by lack of capital. None is made apparent, it seems to me.
If one is going to take the view that lack of capital somehow is a factor to be
taken into account when considering greater hardship, there ought to be some
other evidence other than mere lack of capital. As I have indicated, it seems
to me that lack of capital, by itself and with no more, could hardly be said to
be a matter relevant to hardship.
Having
reviewed the arguments put against this decision of the tribunal, it seems to
me that none of them amounts to a valid point of law. It may be that the estate
in this case is disappointed because their submissions did not find favour with
the tribunal. But, of course, as I have already indicated, this is not a court
of appeal and in the absence of any real suggestion that the tribunal went
wrong in law, theirs is not a decision with which this court should interfere.
This appeal
is, therefore, dismissed.
The appeal
was dismissed with costs.
