Farming partnership — Appellant joining testator in partnership on assurance that he would inherit farm — Partnership later dissolved — Whether unconscionable for testator not to leave farm to appellant — Whether assurance conditional — Whether tenancy granted by testator to appellant sufficient to satisfy equity — Appeal dismissed
The first respondent inherited a freehold farm, Treludick, which had been left to him in the testator’s will dated May 1999. The appellant brought proceedings claiming that he was entitled to the freehold of the farm. He pointed to an oral assurance made by the testator in 1976 that the testator would leave the farm to him, in reliance upon which the appellant had left his own family farming partnership and worked in partnership with the testator at Treludick. In 1984, that partnership was abandoned, it having been decided that each should farm independently separate areas of Treludick. They had accordingly entered into an agreement whereby the testator granted a tenancy of part of the farm to the appellant.
The judge held that it was not unconscionable for the testator to make a will that did not leave Treludick to the appellant, in circumstances where the appellant none the less had a protected transmissible tenancy of part of the farm under the 1984 agreement. The judge found that the natural inference from the context of the testator’s assurance was that the appellant should inherit if all went well with the partnership. On appeal, the appellant challenged, inter alia, the judge’s findings as to the conditional nature of the assurance.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
The judge had correctly applied the principles of proprietary estoppel to the facts. There had been an implicit link between the testator’s promise and the farming of Treludick by the testator in partnership with the appellant. As to the collapse of the partnership, each party had entered into it on the assumption that it would continue until death; the nature of the testator’s assurance had to be implicitly qualified in ways that took account of events that were unforeseen and not expressly catered for in 1976. The scope of the court’s inquiry was not limited to what it would be unconscionable for the testator to have done in 1976, but should also consider subsequent events affecting his conscience. The judge had been entitled to infer that the testator’s 1976 assurance was not irrevocable, whatever happened. The arrangements made on the termination of the partnership satisfied the requirements of equity that the testator should not act unconscionably towards the appellant, who had entered into the partnership in reliance upon an assurance about Treludick.
Mark Cunningham QC and John Meredith Hardy (instructed by Goldbergs, of Plymouth) appeared for the appellant; Penelope Reed (instructed by Burges Salmon, of Bristol) appeared for the respondents.
Sally Dobson, barrister
