Civil practice and procedure – Interim injunction – Claimant seeking possession of hospital bedroom occupied by defendant – Claimant applying for interim injunction requiring defendant to vacate bedroom – Whether claimant entitled to relief sought – Whether defendant having defence to claim – Whether balance of convenience in claimant’s favour – Application granted
The claimant operated a hospital specialising in neurology and neurosurgery. It claimed possession of a bedroom occupied by the defendant in a ward with 12 beds for those requiring acute neuropsychiatry care for periods of up to 14 days.
The claim was said to be urgent because the Covid-19 pandemic meant that the bedroom was urgently needed for other patients; and in any event it was contrary to the defendant’s interests to remain in the hospital, where she was at increased risk of contracting Covid-19. The claimant considered that the defendant could be safely discharged to specially adapted accommodation provided by the local authority, with a care package, which was more than adequate to meet her clinical and other needs.
There was a general stay on possession claims effected by CPR PD 51Z during the Covid-19 pandemic. However, that did not affect claims for injunctions, and the claimant applied for an interim injunction requiring the defendant to vacate the bedroom as she was no longer in need of in-patient care.
The defendant said she had concerns about the care package offered by the local authority connected to her complex mental health conditions, which amounted to disabilities; and to discharge her would be contrary to the claimant’s obligations under articles 3 (torture or inhuman or degrading treatment), 8 (respect for private and family life) and 14 (discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and contrary to section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.
Held: The application was granted.
(1) The claimant brought the claim to enforce its private law rights as property owner. As a matter of private law, the defendant became entitled to occupy the room she was currently in because the claimant permitted her to do so by admitting her to the hospital. The claimant had terminated her licence to occupy that room and she was now a trespasser. The claimant would usually be entitled to seek an order for possession pursuant to CPR part 55 but it was not currently possible because of the general stay on possession claims. The stay did not, however, affect claims for injunctions: see para 3 of CPR PD 51Z. A property owner was in general entitled to an injunction to enforce its rights as against a trespasser. A hospital was no different from any other proprietor in that regard: Manchester Corporation v Connolly [1970] Ch 420 and Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v Meier [2009] UKSC 11, [2010] 1 EGLR 169 followed.
(2) The claimant’s application was for an interim injunction, but it would be tantamount to final relief, if granted. The court should not grant relief unless it was satisfied that there was clearly no defence to the action. Patients had no right to occupy beds or rooms in hospitals except with the hospital’s permission. A hospital was entitled as a matter of private law to withdraw that permission. In deciding whether to do so, the hospital was obliged to balance the needs of the patient currently in occupation against the needs of others who it anticipated might require the bedroom in question. Unless its decision could be stigmatised as unlawful as a matter of public law, there was no basis for the court to deny the hospital’s proprietary claim to restrain the patient from trespassing on its property. Where an interim injunction was sought which would effectively determine the claim, the court had to be satisfied that there was clearly no public law defence to the claim. The balance of convenience and other discretionary factors had also to be considered.
(3) A decision to require a patient to leave a hospital was unlikely to infringe article 3 of the ECHR because it was based on a prior decision not to provide in-patient care. Where the decision to discontinue in-patient care involved the allocation of scarce public resources, the claimant had a positive duty only to take reasonable steps to avoid suffering. In any event, on the evidence before the court as a whole, discharge in the current circumstances would not engage article 3.
Even though the decisions to cease to provide in-patient care to the defendant and to require her to leave plainly interfered with her right to respect for private and family life under article 8, the evidence demonstrated that the interference was justified to protect the rights of others who, unlike the defendant, needed in-patient treatment.
The decision to decline in-patient care did not discriminate against the defendant on the ground of her disabilities. The hospital had treated her in the same way as a patient with different disabilities or with none: on the basis of her clinical need for such care. To the extent that that was itself discrimination against those, like the defendant, whose disabilities made them perceive a need for things for which there was no objective need, the discrimination would be justified. In the context of a serious public health emergency, there was no prospect that a challenge based on article 14 could possibly succeed.
Compliance with the duty in section 149 of the 2010 Act was a matter of substance. The fact that there had been no express reference to that duty did not matter. Full attention had been paid to the defendant’s complex needs and every possible reasonable adjustment made. There was no arguable claim under the 2010 Act. Accordingly, the defendant had no sustainable public law defence to the claim.
(4) It was clear that there was no defence to the claimant’s case which inevitably skewed the balance of convenience in the claimant’s favour. But even if the defendant’s public law arguments had a real prospect of success, the ordinary balance of convenience would still fall decisively in the claimant’s favour. On the one hand, the consequence of relief being granted was that not that the defend would be left without care. On the other hand, in the context of the current public health emergency, the consequence of relief not being granted might be that another patient with a neurological condition might not be able to receive that care.
Simon Sinnatt (instructed by Hempsons) appeared for the claimant; Russell Holland (instructed by Direct Access) appeared for the defendant.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
Click here to read a transcript of University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v MB
