Land registration – Alteration of register – Respondents registering title to lordship of manor and title to certain land as manorial waste – Registration of title to lordship closed on application by appellants but registered title to land upheld – Deputy adjudicator finding that respondents not causing or contributing to mistaken registration through lack of care and that not unjust to leave registration in their name – Para 6 of Schedule 4 to Land Registration Act 2002 – Whether registration of title to land to be removed as consequence of closure of title to associated lordship – Whether deputy adjudicator erring in conclusions on justice of case – Appeal dismissed
The appellants were residents of the village of Ireby, Lancashire. The respondents moved to the village on purchasing a 17th century farmhouse and land, the conveyance of which purported to include the manor or reputed manor of Ireby. The respondents subsequently registered the lordship of the manor of Ireby in their name and also obtained registration as the proprietors of 362 acres of moorland on Ireby Fell as the waste of that manor. Thereafter, they asserted and enforced their newly registered rights. They undertook a process of mapping the fell, put up a gate and posted a printed notice, indicating that they were in possession of the fell; they also imposed formal controls over the use of the fell through agreements for sheep grazing and sporting rights and by sending out letters of objection to the parking of cars on grass verges in the village, which they also claimed as manorial waste.
The appellants applied to alter the register, contending that the registration of the lordship and title to the land were a mistake that should be corrected under paras 5 and 6 of Schedule 4 to the Land Registration Act 2002. The deputy registrar found that the lordship had become extinct by the 17th century and that its mistaken registration as an incorporeal hereditament should be rectified by closing the register. However, he determined that the mistake in registering the respondents as proprietors of the fell should not be rectified; he found that requirements of para 6 for rectification against a proprietor in possession of land were not met since the respondents had not caused or contributed to the mistaken registration through a lack of care and it would not be “unjust” for the alteration not to be made.
On the “injustice” point, the deputy registrar noted that the appellants themselves claimed no title to the fell, that they had not objected to the respondents’ original application for registration despite having notice of it, and that the respondents had since expended money and time on taking and maintaining control of the fell in reliance on their registered title. He concluded that rectification would serve no useful purpose and that it was better for the fell to be owned by the respondents than left in limbo.
The decision of the deputy adjudicator was subsequently upheld by a deputy judge in the High Court. The appellants appealed. They contended that, where the respondents had no title to the lordship, having purchased it from a vendor who had no title to sell, it should logically follow that they had no title to the fell and that the fell registration should also be closed. Part of their argument was that the fell had vested in the Crown on the extinction of the lordship and that the deputy registrar and the judge had not properly taken that interest into account.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
(1) Although the third party interests of the Crown or Duchy of the Lancaster in the fell were a relevant factor, they had no significant impact of the correction of the register or on the outcome of the appeal. Once he had correctly decided that the registration of the respondents as proprietors of the lordship and the fell was a mistake, the deputy adjudicator had not been required to decide who was entitled to the fell. The Crown was not bound by the decision in the case since it had not been joined as a party and had not sought to make representations, let alone assert any title to the fell or taken any step to become involved in the proceedings or the dispute. In those circumstances, the appellants were not entitled to complain that the deputy adjudicator and the deputy judge had been wrong not to accord significant weight to the Crown title in determining the injustice point under para 6 of Schedule 4 to the 2002 Act.
(2) There was logic in the argument that the registration of title to the fell should be rectified on closure of the registration of title to the lordship on which it depended. However, there had been no error in rejecting that argument in light of the requirement, in para 6(2) of Schedule 4, to take the specified factors into account in cases where there was a registered proprietor in possession of the land. Those requirements did not apply in the case of the lordship registration, since it was an incorporeal hereditament and did not fall within the definition of “land”, but they did apply to the registration of title to the fell. The consequential nature of the mistaken registration of the fell did not mean that para 6(2) was disapplied or downgraded. The correction of the mistake as to registration of the lordship did not mean that the consequential registration of the fell also had to be corrected, or that it would be unjust not to correct it.
(3) The deputy adjudicator had not erred in law in concluding that the respondents had not by lack of care caused or contributed to the mistaken registration of the fell. That was a question of fact for the deputy adjudicator, with whose conclusions the appeal court should not interfere unless the there was a misdirection of law, an error of principle or a decision that no reasonable adjudicator, properly directing himself, could have reached on the evidence. The burden had been on the appellants to show that a lack of proper care had caused or contributed to the mistaken registration. The deputy adjudicator had been entitled to conclude, on the materials and submissions before him, that the burden was not discharged. The respondents had behaved reasonably and responsibly in engaging solicitors to advise them and to act for them on the purchase of the farmhouse. The standard to be applied to the solicitors was that of an ordinary competent solicitor undertaking work of that type. The respondents had reasonably believed that they had acquired the lordship by an express conveyance and that the fell went with it as waste of the manor.
(5) Nor had the deputy adjudicator erred in law in concluding that it was not unjust to leave the registration of the fell in the name of the respondents. Whether there would be an injustice was an assessment to be made by the fact-finding tribunal in the light of all the relevant data. The appellants’ primary contention on the injustice point had been that allowing the title to remain with the respondents would deprive the rightful owner of that title and be a windfall to the respondents. However, there was no prospect of anyone but the respondents being registered as proprietors of the fell. In circumstances where the Crown showed no sign of asserting title against the respondents or wishing to engage in the dispute, it was a relevant consideration that the fell should be owned by someone rather than left in limbo with continuing uncertainty about title to it. It was also relevant that there had been a period of inactivity on the part of the appellants in bringing the application for rectification of the register and that, since entering into physical possession of the fell, the respondents had invested time, effort and money on improving the fell and its management. The registration was upheld accordingly.
Paul Stafford and Naomi Winston (instructed by The Law Partnership Solicitors LLP, of Coleshill) appeared for the appellants; Jeffrey Littman (instructed by direct access) appeared for the respondents.
Sally Dobson, barrister
Land registration – Alteration of register – Respondents registering title to lordship of manor and title to certain land as manorial waste – Registration of title to lordship closed on application by appellants but registered title to land upheld – Deputy adjudicator finding that respondents not causing or contributing to mistaken registration through lack of care and that not unjust to leave registration in their name – Para 6 of Schedule 4 to Land Registration Act 2002 – Whether registration of title to land to be removed as consequence of closure of title to associated lordship – Whether deputy adjudicator erring in conclusions on justice of case – Appeal dismissed The appellants were residents of the village of Ireby, Lancashire. The respondents moved to the village on purchasing a 17th century farmhouse and land, the conveyance of which purported to include the manor or reputed manor of Ireby. The respondents subsequently registered the lordship of the manor of Ireby in their name and also obtained registration as the proprietors of 362 acres of moorland on Ireby Fell as the waste of that manor. Thereafter, they asserted and enforced their newly registered rights. They undertook a process of mapping the fell, put up a gate and posted a printed notice, indicating that they were in possession of the fell; they also imposed formal controls over the use of the fell through agreements for sheep grazing and sporting rights and by sending out letters of objection to the parking of cars on grass verges in the village, which they also claimed as manorial waste.The appellants applied to alter the register, contending that the registration of the lordship and title to the land were a mistake that should be corrected under paras 5 and 6 of Schedule 4 to the Land Registration Act 2002. The deputy registrar found that the lordship had become extinct by the 17th century and that its mistaken registration as an incorporeal hereditament should be rectified by closing the register. However, he determined that the mistake in registering the respondents as proprietors of the fell should not be rectified; he found that requirements of para 6 for rectification against a proprietor in possession of land were not met since the respondents had not caused or contributed to the mistaken registration through a lack of care and it would not be “unjust” for the alteration not to be made.On the “injustice” point, the deputy registrar noted that the appellants themselves claimed no title to the fell, that they had not objected to the respondents’ original application for registration despite having notice of it, and that the respondents had since expended money and time on taking and maintaining control of the fell in reliance on their registered title. He concluded that rectification would serve no useful purpose and that it was better for the fell to be owned by the respondents than left in limbo.The decision of the deputy adjudicator was subsequently upheld by a deputy judge in the High Court. The appellants appealed. They contended that, where the respondents had no title to the lordship, having purchased it from a vendor who had no title to sell, it should logically follow that they had no title to the fell and that the fell registration should also be closed. Part of their argument was that the fell had vested in the Crown on the extinction of the lordship and that the deputy registrar and the judge had not properly taken that interest into account.Held: The appeal was dismissed. (1) Although the third party interests of the Crown or Duchy of the Lancaster in the fell were a relevant factor, they had no significant impact of the correction of the register or on the outcome of the appeal. Once he had correctly decided that the registration of the respondents as proprietors of the lordship and the fell was a mistake, the deputy adjudicator had not been required to decide who was entitled to the fell. The Crown was not bound by the decision in the case since it had not been joined as a party and had not sought to make representations, let alone assert any title to the fell or taken any step to become involved in the proceedings or the dispute. In those circumstances, the appellants were not entitled to complain that the deputy adjudicator and the deputy judge had been wrong not to accord significant weight to the Crown title in determining the injustice point under para 6 of Schedule 4 to the 2002 Act.(2) There was logic in the argument that the registration of title to the fell should be rectified on closure of the registration of title to the lordship on which it depended. However, there had been no error in rejecting that argument in light of the requirement, in para 6(2) of Schedule 4, to take the specified factors into account in cases where there was a registered proprietor in possession of the land. Those requirements did not apply in the case of the lordship registration, since it was an incorporeal hereditament and did not fall within the definition of “land”, but they did apply to the registration of title to the fell. The consequential nature of the mistaken registration of the fell did not mean that para 6(2) was disapplied or downgraded. The correction of the mistake as to registration of the lordship did not mean that the consequential registration of the fell also had to be corrected, or that it would be unjust not to correct it.(3) The deputy adjudicator had not erred in law in concluding that the respondents had not by lack of care caused or contributed to the mistaken registration of the fell. That was a question of fact for the deputy adjudicator, with whose conclusions the appeal court should not interfere unless the there was a misdirection of law, an error of principle or a decision that no reasonable adjudicator, properly directing himself, could have reached on the evidence. The burden had been on the appellants to show that a lack of proper care had caused or contributed to the mistaken registration. The deputy adjudicator had been entitled to conclude, on the materials and submissions before him, that the burden was not discharged. The respondents had behaved reasonably and responsibly in engaging solicitors to advise them and to act for them on the purchase of the farmhouse. The standard to be applied to the solicitors was that of an ordinary competent solicitor undertaking work of that type. The respondents had reasonably believed that they had acquired the lordship by an express conveyance and that the fell went with it as waste of the manor.(5) Nor had the deputy adjudicator erred in law in concluding that it was not unjust to leave the registration of the fell in the name of the respondents. Whether there would be an injustice was an assessment to be made by the fact-finding tribunal in the light of all the relevant data. The appellants’ primary contention on the injustice point had been that allowing the title to remain with the respondents would deprive the rightful owner of that title and be a windfall to the respondents. However, there was no prospect of anyone but the respondents being registered as proprietors of the fell. In circumstances where the Crown showed no sign of asserting title against the respondents or wishing to engage in the dispute, it was a relevant consideration that the fell should be owned by someone rather than left in limbo with continuing uncertainty about title to it. It was also relevant that there had been a period of inactivity on the part of the appellants in bringing the application for rectification of the register and that, since entering into physical possession of the fell, the respondents had invested time, effort and money on improving the fell and its management. The registration was upheld accordingly.Paul Stafford and Naomi Winston (instructed by The Law Partnership Solicitors LLP, of Coleshill) appeared for the appellants; Jeffrey Littman (instructed by direct access) appeared for the respondents.Sally Dobson, barrister
