Town and country planning – Planning permission – National planning policy framework – Claimant local authority refusing planning permission to demolish timber structure in garden and replace with garden room – Inspector appointed by secretary of state allowing appeal – Claimant applying for statutory review – Whether extension of existing building required to be physically attached to building – Application dismissed
The second defendants owned a property in Vicarage Road, Stoneleigh, a village “washed over” by the West Midlands green belt. The property consisted of a Grade II-listed timber-framed cottage, garden, garage and a currently disused timber structure. That structure had a footprint of 10.2m2 and appeared to have been originally used as a garage. It was in the garden of the cottage but was approximately 20m from the cottage itself.
The second defendants applied to the claimant local authority for planning permission to demolish the timber structure and replace it with a garden room/home office with a footprint of 16m2. The claimant refused permission on the basis that the proposed structure did not fall within any of the exceptions to the principle that the construction of new buildings in the green belt was inappropriate.
The second defendants’ appeal against that decision was allowed by an inspector appointed by the first defendant secretary of state on the basis that the new building was within the exception in paragraph 149(c) of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) namely “the extension or alteration of a building provided that it does not result in disproportionate additions over and above the size of the original building”.
The claimant applied for statutory review of the inspector’s decision pursuant to section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The claimant argued that, on its proper interpretation, for a new building to be an extension of an existing building, the former had to be physically attached to the latter. Consequently, the inspector erred in law in concluding that the exception applied.
Held: The application was dismissed.
(1) If the language of paragraph 149(c) was considered in isolation from its context the claimant’s interpretation of the words used would be the more natural reading. However, the first defendant’s interpretation that an extension of a building could include a physically detached structure was also a tenable reading of the words used. The latter interpretation was the reading which accorded more readily with the content and purpose of the relevant part of the NPPF. While the claimant’s interpretation had the potential to lead to artificial distinctions which would do nothing to further the purposes of the green belt, that advanced by the first defendant would remove the risk of that artificiality without jeopardising those purposes: Wiltshire Council v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2020] EWHC 954 (Admin); [2020] PTSR 1409 considered.
(2) It could not be assumed that development which would be an extension of a dwelling could necessarily be regarded as an extension of a building. Thus, a dwelling could readily be regarded as including a number of structures physically separated from each other, each of which would be a separate building for the purposes of the 1990 Act (and so for the purposes of the NPPF) but which would nonetheless form part of the same dwelling and be “normal domestic adjuncts” of the relevant dwelling house. Paragraph 149(c) of the NPPF was concerned with “the extension… of a building” not with the extension of a dwelling: Sevenoaks District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1997] EWHC 1012 (Admin) distinguished. Turner v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2016] EWCA Civ 466; [2016] EGLR 53 considered.
Paragraph 149 was concerned with “the construction of new buildings” in the sense of new free-standing structures. A building could readily be regarded as being an adjunct to another building even though the two were not physically connected. Buildings could readily be considered to be extensions of other buildings even though the buildings were not physically connected. In the domestic setting it was not artificial to describe garages or other outbuildings as extensions of the principal dwelling house. In non-domestic settings it was similarly not artificial to see sundry ancillary structures as being ancillary to and extensions of the main building.
(3) Paragraph 149(c) was to be read in the context of the NPPF as a whole and, more particularly, in light of the purposes of the green belt. It was apparent from the sub-paragraphs of paragraph 149 that there were instances in which the erection of a new building would not be inappropriate in the green belt. To read paragraph 149(c) as permitting extensions which were physically distinct from the building being extended was not obviously harmful to the green belt or inconsistent with the thrust of paragraph 149 read as a whole. The requirement that the structure in question must not result in disproportionate additions over and above the size of the original building operated to provide protection for the purposes of the green belt.
The presence or absence of a physical connection between the original building and the new building was not conclusive and arguably was of minimal relevance to the degree of impact on the green belt.
(4) In the present case, the cottage dated from the 17th century and had a Grade II listing. As such, it did not have the benefit of permitted development rights and although permission had been given for a replacement rear extension, the scope for extensions which were physically attached to the building would inevitably be limited by the need to have regard to its special character. One could readily envisage circumstances where the installation of a detached outbuilding close to a listed dwelling in the green belt would be less harmful both to the purposes of the green belt and to the character of the listed building than an attached structure. The claimant’s interpretation of paragraph 149(c) would exclude the possibility of such detached structures and preclude any extension where an attached extension was precluded by reason of the building’s listed character.
Accordingly, paragraph 149(c) was not to be interpreted as being confined to physically attached structures: an extension for the purposes of that provision could include structures which were physically detached from the building of which they were an extension. Therefore, the inspector did not err in law in granting planning permission.
Ben Fullbrook (instructed by Warwickshire Legal Services) appeared for the claimant; Victoria Hutton (instructed by the Government Legal Department) appeared for the first defendant; the second defendants did not appear and were not represented.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
