Meaning of advertisements — Canopy and dutch blind — Name of business on canopy and dutch blind — Advertisement Control Regulations — Deemed consent for class IV advertisements on business premises — Whether canopy and dutch blind with name of business advertisement — Meaning of “display of advertisements” — Whether Secretary of State erred in law in allowing appeal against enforcement notice — Appeal by local planning authority dismissed
In September 1985 the appellants issued enforcement notices in respect an alleged breach of planning control at two separate business premises. One notice referred to a dutch blind on which were the words “Bally of Switzerland” attached to premises at 30 Old Bond Street, London W1, and the other to a canopy at premises at 19 Nottingham Place, London W1, with the words “The Regency Hotel”. The recipient of each notice, the second respondents in each of these two cases, appealed against the notice on, inter alia, ground (b) of section 88(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971, contending that the dutch blind or canopy, as the case may be, was an advertisement for which there was deemed consent by virtue of section 64 of the 1971 Act and the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) Regulations 1984, reg 14(1), class IV.
The appellants appealed the decision of the Secretary of State, who had allowed the second respondents’ appeals on the basis that the blind or canopy was an “advertisement” within reg 2(1) of the 1984 regulations. It was submitted for the appellants that the interpretation of “advertisement” at reg 2(1) must be restrictively construed and the words “includes any boarding or similar structure … used, or adapted for use for the display of advertisements” did not include the blind or canopy, as these, if structures, were not similar to a “hoarding”.
Held The appeals were dismissed with costs to the first respondent and to the second respondent in first case.
In deciding whether something is an advertisement, one must look at the subject-matter in dispute and use common sense. Then one should look at the regulations to see whether anything flies in the face of common sense. In the present cases there was a blind or canopy and words; these must be conjoined. The result is a display of advertisements. Reg 2(1) defines an “advertisement” as meaning various things and then adds: “… and (without prejudice to the preceding provisions of this definition) includes any boarding or similar structure or any balloon used, or adapted for use for the display of advertisements, and references to the display of advertisements shall be construed accordingly”. The words “without prejudice to …” and “includes” show that “hoarding or similar structure” is not intended to limit the meaning of the “display of advertisements” to hoarding or similar structure but to encompass anything else displayed with advertisements. This is not an exclusive definition. The blind and canopy were advertisements and had the benefit of deemed consent under the 1984 regulations.
City of Glasgow District Council v Secretary of State for Scotland
[1989] 1 PLR 84 considered.
Christopher Katkowski (instructed by the solicitor to the Westminster City London Borough Council) appeared for the appellants; Duncan Ouseley (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the first respondent in each case; and Andrew Kelly (instructed by Carter Faber) appeared for Bally Group (UK) Ltd, the second respondent in the first case. The second respondent in the second case, Rosindo Musto, did not appear and was not represented.
