Section 69 of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 obliges a local planning authority (“LPA”) from time to time to determine which parts of its area are “areas of special architectural or historic interest the character of which it is desirable to preserve or enhance”, and then to designate such areas as conservation areas. (A number of important consequences flow from designation, including an increase in the powers of the LPA to control the development and use of the land and buildings involved.) There is, however, no further statutory assistance for an LPA in deciding exactly what it may properly include within a formal designation. It is necessary to refer to judicial authority for guidance.
It seems clear from R v Canterbury City Council, ex parte Halford [1992] 2 PLR 137 that the LPA is entitled to consider as one entity the whole of an area that gives rise to special architectural or historic interest, and that not every part of that area need have on or in it something giving rise to such interest. It also seems clear from that case that a challenge to the designation of the boundaries can only be brought on a Wednesbury basis.
In R v Surrey County Council, ex parte Oakimber Ltd [1995] EGCS 120, the court dismissed a challenge to the designation of 350 acres of land at Brooklands in Surrey, forming the site of the famous motor racing track and aerodrome, rejecting the contention that the LPA had failed to take into account the fact that extensive parts of the area had been the subject of modern commercial and industrial development.
Now, in R (on the application of GRA Acquisition Ltd) V Oxford City Council [2015] EWHC 76 (Admin); [2015] PLSCS 23 the court has upheld the designation of Oxford Stadium – a former greyhound racing track and speedway stadium – as a conservation area, concluding that the designation was not irrational. The facts that no building within the site was of a quality justifying listing, and that the quality generally was ephemeral, did not affect the matter. As long as there was no improper purpose behind the designation, the planning judgment was not one to which no reasonable LPA could come.
John Martin is a planning law consultant
