Yes, we have yet another case on whether a building is a “house”. If it is, the leaseholder can enfranchise under the Leasehold Reform Act 1967.
This latest decision (Grosvenor (Mayfair) Estate and another v Merix International Ventures [2017] EWCA Civ 190) concerns a substantial property (with a floor area of some 954.74m2) which was originally built as a large house (with a mews annex). It is situated in the heart of prime central London and it had been empty and unused for 13 years when in December 2003 the leaseholder (a registered company) gave notice claiming the freehold under the Act.
Proceedings ensued and the central London county court decided that the building was a house reasonably so-called.
Only a building which is a “house” can be enfranchised. Under section 2(1) of the Act (a “deceptively simple statutory definition,” said the trial Judge) a “house” includes any building designed or adapted for living in and reasonably so-called.
It was agreed that the building could be described as a large London townhouse, which was used as residence until after the Second World War and then as office accommodation with some residential use in other parts of the building and in the mews.
The leaseholder claimed that the now empty building was a house (with some traces of former office user); Grosvenor (the landlord) argued that the building was a disused office building with some ancillary residential accommodation. In the county court the Judge (who had inspected the building and found it a “quite overwhelming residential character… a still grand Mayfair townhouse”) (para 27) decided that the building was a house. Grosvenor (the landlord) appealed: as it was agreed that the building was designed or adapted for living and the thrust of the appeal was on whether the building is a house “reasonably so called”.
Litigation on this issue has been frequent with many cases reaching the House of Lords and the Supreme Court. The trial Judge cited the well-known decisions of Tandon v Trustees of Spurgenos Homes [1982] AC 755; Boss Holdings v Grosvenor Estate Belgravia [2008] 1 WLR 289; Prospect Estates v Grosvenor Estate Belgravia [2009] 1 WLR 1313 and Hoseby Ltd v Day [2012] 1 WLR 2884.
The Boss case concerned a building in the same street as the one in this appeal. It had also been leased for both residential and commercial use though but when the enfranchisement claim was made it was in a very poor state of repair. It was factors such as this which led the lower courts to the conclusion that at the date of the claim the building was no longer designed or adapted for living in and was not therefore a house. This conclusion was rejected by the House of Lords, which concluded that the building was still a house.
In this case the judge decided that the Boss case was closest to this one. Dismissing the landlord’s appeal, the Court saw no reason to disturb the conclusion of the lower court: the building was a house reasonably so called.
James Driscoll is a solicitor and a writer
