In Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government v Hopkins Developments Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 470, the Court of Appeal reviewed the principles of natural justice applying in planning appeal inquiries, particularly in relation to the duties imposed upon the inspector. Jackson LJ derived, inter alia, the following principles from his review of earlier authorities: (1) Any party to a planning inquiry is entitled (a) to know the case which he has to meet and (b) to have a reasonable opportunity to adduce evidence and make submissions in relation to that opposing case. (2) If there is a procedural unfairness that materially prejudices a party to a planning inquiry, that may be a good ground for quashing the inspector’s decision.
The decision in Lear Investments Ltd v Welsh Ministers [2015] EWHC 1532 (Admin) confirms, possibly unsurprisingly, that similar principles apply where the planning appeal has been conducted by means of written representations.
There the claimant had sought planning permission to demolish an outdated industrial building – divided into eight separate units – and to build 34 residential units in its place. Its proposals conflicted with policies in the development plan seeking to protect employment opportunities. However, it argued that upkeep and maintenance of the building in its present state was uneconomic, the cost of refurbishment was prohibitive and the cost of redevelopment likewise. Furthermore, there was no demand in the market for industrial units of the age, condition and sizes involved.
The local planning authority refused planning permission. The claimant then appealed to the secretary of state, and its appeal proceeded on the basis of written representations. The inspector dismissed the appeal.
The claimant then applied to quash the inspector’s decision on two separate grounds. One of those grounds was that there had been procedural unfairness. More particularly, the claimant contended that the inspector had taken it upon himself to give evidence of his own that there had been a very subdued period in the local economy, following the downturn in the global economy, and that this was a new point on which it should have been invited by the inspector to comment.
Although (i) quashing the inspector’s decision on the claimant’s other ground (ii) referring to Hopkins and (iii) being mildly critical of the inspector for choosing to delve into such matters, the court rejected this ground. While it was “close to the line”, doing so would not have made any difference to the inspector’s approach.
John Martin is a planning law consultant
