Town and Country Planning Act 1971 — Caravan — Enforcement notices alleging breach of planning control — Whether chalet a caravan for this purpose — Whether enlarged definition of caravan in the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 applicable — Appeal from decision of deputy High Court judge
caravan site applied in November 1960 for planning permission for the continued
use of an existing caravan site subject to a revised lay-out and the inclusion
of an additional area — The permission sought was granted, one of the
conditions of the grant being that no fresh structures would be allowed without
specific consent — Subsequently the then owners erected a chalet on the site,
which brought a response from the planning authority in the shape of
enforcement notices complaining that the chalet represented a breach of control
— The owners appealed against the notices to the Secretary of State and his
inspector quashed the notices — On appeal by the planning authority to the High
Court, Mr David Widdicombe QC, sitting as a deputy judge, upheld the Secretary
of State’s decision — The planning authority then brought the present appeal to
the Court of Appeal
between the parties was whether the word ‘caravan’ should be construed in its
ordinary, natural meaning, in which case the erection of a chalet was clearly a
breach, or whether it had the meaning set out in section 29(1) of the Caravan
Sites and Control of Development Act 1960, in which case the erection was not a
breach — According to the latter definition, ‘caravan’ meant ‘any structure
designed or adapted for human habitation which is capable of being moved from
one place to another (whether by being towed, or by being transported on a
motor vehicle or trailer)’
on behalf of the owners that as from the date when the 1960 Act came into force
(August 29 1960) any application in regard to caravans must be considered
against the enlarged definition of caravan introduced by that Act — The Court
of Appeal rejected this submission — The application made in November 1960 for
a continuation of caravan use regarded ‘caravan’ in the traditional ordinary
and natural meaning of the word, as residential accommodation on wheels — This
view was reinforced by the fact that the permission actually granted
differentiated between caravans and ‘structures’ — Held accordingly that the
chalet was not a caravan — Appeal allowed and decision below set aside
The following
case is referred to in this report.
Cozens
v Brutus [1973] AC 854; [1972] 3 WLR 521;
[1972] 2 All ER 1297; (1972) Cr App R 799, HL
This was an
appeal by the planning authority, Wyre Forest District Council, from the decision
of David Widdicombe QC dismissing an appeal against the Secretary of State for
the Environment, who had allowed appeals by the caravan site owners, Allen
Caravans (Estates) Ltd, against enforcement notices issued by the planning
authority.
John Macdonald
QC and Timothy Jones (instructed by the solicitor to Wyre Forest District
Council) appeared on behalf of the appellants; I Ashford-Thom (instructed by
the Treasury Solicitor) represented the first respondent, the Secretary of
State for the Environment; Clifford Joseph (instructed by Tozers, of Exeter)
represented the second respondent, Allen Caravans (Estates) Ltd.
Giving the
first judgment at the invitation of Dillon LJ, MANN LJ said: There is before
the court an appeal from Mr David Widdicombe QC, sitting as a deputy judge of
the Queen’s Bench Division on January 27 1988. On that day he adjudicated upon
an appeal under section 246 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971. That
appeal was an appeal by the district planning authority against the quashing by
the Secretary of State for the Environment’s inspector of two enforcement
notices. The appellant before this court is the Wyre Forest District Council.
The first respondent is the Secretary of State, and the second is Allen’s
Caravans (Estates) Ltd, who are owners of the site which was subject to the
enforcement notice, that is to say the Sladd Lane Caravan Site, Wolverley, in
Hereford.
In order to
appreciate the matter one has to look at certain events in history. On November
16 1960 there was an application by the second respondents’ predecessors in
title for a planning permission. It was an application to the Kidderminster
Rural District Council; the appellants are statutory successors to that
council. It is an application in simple form for a detailed planning
permission. In answer to question 5 on the form — which was a question asking
for a brief description of the proposed development and the existing use of the
land or buildings concerned — it was said: ‘Continuation of use of existing
caravan site with revised lay-out. Use of additional area as caravan site’. And
as to the existing use it was said: ‘Part caravan site, part hostel on
de-requisition by the Ministry.’
The reference
to ‘continuation of use’ was a reference to a situation where there was an
extant permission for 60 caravans to be stationed upon the land. There was a
lapse of time after the application because of negotiations about what the
ultimate planning permission should be, but on December 5 1961 the rural
district council granted a permission. It is headed as follows:
Kidderminster
Rural District Council. Town and Country Planning Acts 1947-54. Town and
Country Planning General Development Order 1950.
— I then drop
some lines and it continues —
In pursuance
of powers delegated to them by the Worcestershire County Council the Council
hereby permit development comprising 205 caravans situate at Blakeshall Hostel,
Wolverley, in accordance with the application
conditions . . .
It is to be
recollected that the application to which reference is made, and which can be
taken into account in accord with established authority in construing the
permission, was the ‘continuation of use of existing caravan site’.
The conditions
were eight in number. It is unnecessary to refer to more than the first four:
(1) This permission shall allow the use of the
land as a holiday caravan site only during the period 1st February – 31st
December in each year.
(2) This permission applies only to the land
edged red on the plan submitted with the application and the site shall be laid
out in accordance with the plan.
(3) No structures shall be used for
all-the-year-round living accommodation.
(4) This consent relates to the siting of 205
caravans only and no fresh structures shall be allowed on the site without the
specific consent, in writing, of the Planning Authority.
It is to be
observed that there is a dichotomy between ‘caravans’ and ‘structures’. The
plan referred to appears to show the siting of 205 caravans.
What has
occurred is that on a part of the site there was erected what is popularly
known as a chalet, a structure which can be moved but which lacks wheels. It is
agreed between the parties that in no ordinary and natural meaning of the word
‘caravan’ could the chalet be described as such. As to ‘ordinary and natural
meaning’, reference may be made to, for example, Viscount Dilhorne’s speech in Cozens
v Brutus [1973] AC 854 at p 865G. The erection of the chalet excited
the attention of the district planning authority, who on December 3 1985 served
two enforcement notices, as I understand it in the alternative, but nothing
turns upon that. The first notice asserted a failure to comply with condition
(4) which I have read. The second notice asserted an erection without the grant
of planning permission.
There was an
appeal to the Secretary of State and the appeal was heard by an appointed
person, who on January 5 1987 gave his decision quashing both of the notices.
There was subsequently the appeal to the High Court under section 246, to which
I have referred.
The issue
between the parties is an extremely narrow one. It is as to the meaning of the
word ‘caravan’ as employed in the permission of December 5 1961. At first blush
it might be thought there could be no dubiety about what was meant by ‘caravan’
in that permission. The ordinary person would understand ‘caravan’ as being
residential accommodation on wheels and as not comprehending a chalet such as
we have seen in the photographs. First blush is, however, not sufficient in
this case. It is not sufficient because on August 29 1960 there came into force
the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 and that contained a
definition of ‘caravan’ in section 29(1). The definition was introduced as part
of the licensing regime introduced by that Act, a regime additional or
supplemental to the planning regime.
Section 29(1)
says:
In this Part
of this Act, unless the context otherwise requires — ‘caravan’ means any structure
designed or adapted for human habitation which is capable of being moved from
one place to another (whether by being towed, or by being transported on a
motor vehicle or trailer) and any motor vehicle so designed or adapted, but
does not include . . .
and I need read
no further.
It is agreed
between the parties that the chalet in question is within that definition.
The Town and
Country Planning Act 1947, which was the primary legislation in force at the
time of the planning application in 1960 and of its determination, does not
refer to ‘caravan’ or ‘caravan site’ at all. Its innocence in that regard was
disturbed by sections 21 and 22 of the 1960 Act, which were repealed by the
Town and Country Planning Act 1962. Section 21 of the 1960 Act provided:
After the
commencement of this Act the use of any land as a caravan site shall not be
treated by virtue of subsection (5) of section 12 of the Act of 1947 as a use
for which permission is not required under Part III of the Act of 1947 unless
the land has been so used on one occasion at least during the period of two
years ending with the ninth day of March, nineteen hundred and sixty.
The purpose of
that provision was to take away certain existing use rights — that is rights
existing on July 1 1948. The Act of 1947 permitted a reversion and some
temporary use and permitted occasional uses to continue, and also dealt with
unoccupied land.
The 1960 Act
was followed by an amendment to the then Town and Country Planning General
Development Order and Development Charge Application Regulations of 1950 (SI
728). The amendment was in the Town and Country Planning General Development
(Amendment No 2) Order 1960. By article 2 of that order there was injected into
the 1950 order the definition of ‘caravan’ obtained from the 1960 Act. The
effect of the order — which I think has no great significance in this case —
was to withdraw, in regard to caravan sites, the permission for 28 days and the
permission for certain recreational uses. It also added to permitted uses the
use of caravans in circumstances specified in paras 2 to 9 of the First
Schedule to the 1960 Act, and also to development that was required by a site
licence. The circumstances contained in paras 2 to 9 of the First Schedule to
the 1960 Act are highly specialised. I instance, by reference to the paragraph
headings, ‘Use by a person travelling with a caravan for one or two nights’,
‘Use of holding of five acres or more in certain circumstances’, ‘Sites
occupied and supervised by exempted organisations’, ‘Sites approved by exempted
organisations’, ‘Meetings organised by exempted organisations’, and so on.
The contest,
therefore, is whether the word ‘caravan’ in the permission of December 1961
bears its ordinary and natural meaning or whether it bears the enlarged meaning
injected into the law by the Act of 1960, and, for that matter, by the General
Development (Amendment No 2) Order of 1960.
The appellant
says that the ordinary and natural meaning should be applied. They point to the
distinction in the conditions which is drawn between ‘caravans’ and
‘structures’.
The first
respondent suggested, but withdrew the suggestion, that the application of
November 16 1960, in the terms which I have recited, must be taken to have been
enlarged by the change in the law effected as from August 29 1960. I cannot
accept that for a moment. An application is for what it is and is not capable
of enlargement in the way suggested.
On behalf of
the second respondent, Mr Joseph, in the course of his careful argument,
suggested that as from August 29 1960, any application in regard to caravans
must be considered against the background of the definition of ‘caravan sites’
injected into the law as from that date. For my part, and with respect, I
regard that as quite unrealistic. The application was for continuation of use
of an existing caravan site with revised lay-out. That must have been an
application which regarded ‘caravan’ in the traditional or ordinary and natural
meaning of the word. I am reinforced in that view by the permission in fact
granted, which differentiates between caravans and structures. If it had been
intended to grant a permission — which I do not think could have been granted
because it would have enlarged the terms of the application — in terms of the
recently introduced definition of ‘caravan’, it would have been easy to say so
and there would have been no differentiation such as one finds in the
conditions.
The learned
deputy judge’s reasons are to be found on p 9 of his judgment, where he says:
Turning back
to the document which has to be construed, I regard it as significant that the
phrase ‘caravan site’ appears in the document. It appears inferentially because
the application was for a caravan site, and the permission is granted for 205
caravans in accordance with the application, and it appears expressly in
Condition No 1 and in Reason No 1. In a document issued under the Town and
Country Planning Act, this phrase must bear the meaning which it has in that
Act, unless there is some clear reason why it should not do so. I can see no
such reason here. It seems plain enough that the application for planning
permission was made in consequence of the Act of 1960 no doubt with a view to
obtaining a site licence under that Act. There is a clear inference from the
circumstances, in my view, that both the application and the permission were
framed in terms of the statutory definition of ‘caravan site’.
If that is
so, it must follow almost inevitably, in my view, that the word ‘caravan’ in
the document also has its statutory meaning. The definition of ‘caravan site’
contains the word ‘caravan’ with its statutory meaning. What possible reason
could there be for the word to have a different meaning than that when it
appears in the same document? To ascribe
a different meaning to it would lead to hopeless confusion both in the
construction and the application of the permission.
I regret, and
with great respect, I cannot follow the learned deputy judge through his
reasoning. I think the simplest course for those who consider the terms of
planning permissions is to regard the words employed in them in their ordinary
and natural meaning. In the ordinary and natural meaning, as is agreed, this
chalet is not a caravan. I would accordingly allow this appeal.
TAYLOR LJ and
DILLON LJ agreed and did not add anything.
Appeal
allowed; decision of the deputy judge set aside and case remitted to the
Secretary of State. Appellants to have their costs of the appeal against both
respondents and their costs of the hearing at first instance against the second
respondent. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords refused.